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THE PERIL AND PROMISE OF PREFERRED STOCK 
BY BEN WALTHER' 
ABSTRACT 
This Article presents a comprehensive legal analysis of preferred 
stock in the wake of the doctrinally transformative cases ofTrados (2009), 
LC Capital (2010), and Thoughtworks (2011). These cases mark the 
culmination of a long and gradual decimation of the legal rights of 
preferred shareholders under Delaware corporate law. Preferred stock has 
become less secure than ever, as opportunistic issuers have demonstrated 
the ability and the willingness to divert its investment value to the common 
equity. As a result, it is disappearing, along with its unique financial 
properties that help struggling firms avoid insolvency. This Article offers a 
novel solution to restore preferred stock to viability: a specific division of 
corporate control between preferred and common that will allow them to 
harmoniously co-exist. One central advantage of this approach is that it 
requires no changes in existing law to be implemented; only clever, 
sophisticated bargaining by each side is required. 
'Assistant Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. Thanks to Dan 
Barnhizer, Mae Kuykendall, Bruce Bean, Larry Backer, Glen Staszewski, Virginia Harper Ho and 
all the participants in the Michigan State College of Law Junior Faculty Forum. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The irony of preferred stock is that courts treat it with disdain.' It 
should be a staple of modem finance, because it offers an unparalleled 
financial flexibility that helps businesses stay afloat during hard times and 
thus reduces bankruptcy risk for investors.2 Yet it has virtually disappeared 
in most mature industries, largely because preferred shareholders have found 
it terribly difficult to protect the value of their investment.3 As a result, they 
demand a risk premium that few companies are willing to pay, except as a 
last resort. 4 Today, nearly all public preferred stock is issued by financial 
1See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Venture Capital On The Downside: Preferred Stock And 
Corporate Control, 100 MICH. L. REv. 891, 894 (2002) (stating that courts are as hostile as ever 
toward preferred stockholders). 
2 See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text (discussing the utility of preferred stock in 
avoiding creditor opportunism). 
3 See, e.g., Bratton, supra note I, at 892 ("The only mature firms that fmance with preferred, 
which once was ubiquitous in American capital structures, tend to be firms in regulated industries 
having little choice in the matter."). 
4For instance, Goldman Sachs famously issued $5B in preferred stock to Warren Buffett in 
September 2008, when it badly needed new capital to ensure that it survived the great fmancial crisis 
of that year. See, e.g., Zachery Kouwe, Buffett's Goldman Stake Pays Richly, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 
2009), http:/ /dealbook.nytimes.corn12009/07 /24/buffetts-goldman-stake-worth-91-billion/? _php 
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institutions, insurance companies, or other institutions subject to strict capital 
adequacy regulation,5 as illustrated by the size and composition of preferred 
stock exchange-tradable funds. 6 Preferred stock is more commonly used for 
funding startups, owing to the peculiar risk-return ratio sought by venture 
capitalists. 7 Even in that context, however, its use may be declining, as some 
venture capitalists are rethinking their commitment to an investment vehicle 
that offers few legal protections. 8 
The problem is that corporate law now gives short shrift to the equity 
aspect of preferred stock. Financially, preferred stock resembles debt, in that 
it has limited upside and its return comes in the form of periodic coupon 
payments.9 Legally, though, it is much more like common equity: preferred 
=true&_type=blogs&_r=O (discussing the original investment and its appreciation to an estimated 
$9.1B nine months later). The terms were almost usurious: Buffett was able to extract a 10 percent 
yield and an in-the-money option to buy another $5B worth of common stock. !d. At the time, 
though, Goldman had few better options: the capital markets were frozen and investors were scared 
to invest in any investment bank. !d. Within a year, Buffet's investment almost doubled in value. 
!d. 
5In the United States and other countries that comply with the Basel Capital Accords, 
institutions regulated as banks are required to finance a certain amount of their lending (or other 
asset acquisitions) with instruments junior to senior unsecured debt. See generally Julie Andersen 
Hill, Bank Capital Regulation by Enforcement: An Empirical Study, 87 IND. L.J. 645, 649-56 
(2012) (explaining bank capital requirements). Currently, 4 percent of a bank's risk-weighted assets 
must be fmanced with Tier 1 capital (which consists mostly of common equity), and 8 percent must 
be financed with Tier I or Tier 2 capital. See id. at 654. Preferred stock counts as Tier 2 capital, 
whereas ordinary debt does not. /d. at 652. Thus, banks interested in maximizing the financial 
leverage of its common equity have an incentive to issue preferred stock to meet the Tier 2 capital 
requirements. 
6To take one example, Blackrock's iS hares Preferred Stock ETF-the largest preferred stock 
ETF, traded under the symbol "PFF"-holds over 83 percent of its non-real estate preferred assets in 
the "Diversified Financial," "Banks," and "Insurance" sectors. See iShares U.S. Preferred 
Stock ETF Fact Sheet, available at http://us.ishares.com/content/stream.jsp?url=/content/en_us 
/repository/resource/fact_sheet/pff. pdf&mimeType=application/pdf. 
7The typical venture capital business model involves distributing bits of money to a large 
number of startups, hoping that a few of them will tum into exponentially-growing companies. See 
Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt And The Missing Lever Of Corporate 
Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 1209, 1218, 1220 (2006). A handful of early-stage investments in 
firms like Google, Facebook, or Groupon can more than make up for hundreds of unsuccessful bets 
on failed startups. The model does not work, though, if the venture capitalist can lose its equity 
investments in a struggling startup that files for bankruptcy before becoming a hit. See id. at 1227-
29. Thus, VCs are keenly interested in making sure their portfolio firms do not issue debt, because 
there can be no bankruptcy without creditors. See id. at 1219. Thus, they invest by means of 
preferred stock. See id. at 1229-30. The insecurity of the preferred stock form costs little, since 
VCs do not expect to recoup their investments in failed startups anyway. See id. at 1230-31. 
8See, e.g., Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control In 
Startups, 81 N.Y.U.L. REv. 967, 978 (2006) ("When determining which strategies the firm should 
pursue, directors elected by common shareholders owe a duty solely to common shareholders and are 
not required to take into account the interests of preferred shareholders, as long as the firm does not 
violate specific provisions of the preferred stock agreement."). 
9See II WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER'S CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
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shareholders, unlike creditors, cannot sue in contract to recoup either their 
principal investment or unpaid coupons, and the terms of a preferred stock 
investment, unlike those of a debt contract, can be altered unilaterally by the 
firrn. 10 As a result, the value of fixed income equity can be opportunistically 
expropriated by common equity, by such means as dilutive mergers, 
leveraged recapitalizations, or risk-seeking economic strategies.'' Not even 
venture capitalists are safe, despite their deep experience with preferred 
stock and their business power over the companies. 12 Occasionally, they let 
down their guard, and then can only watch helplessly as their investments 
are decimated. 13 
The corporate law once offered at least a modicum of protection 
against exploitation. For instance, the famous 1986 Court of Chancery case 
Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc. held that boards must respect fiduciary 
duties when dealing with the preferred. 14 Over the past three decades, 
however, courts have eroded such duties to the preferred so far that they 
exist in name only. 15 Indeed, recent opinions have suggested that the board 
may even have a fiduciary duty to siphon value from the preferred when the 
opportunity arises. 16 Today, preferred shareholders must protect themselves 
with contract-like covenants in the certificate of designation17---covenants 
CORPORATIONS § 5289 (West 2013) [hereinafter FLETCHER CYC. CORP.]. A coupon payment is a 
payment made on a financial instrument according to a fixed schedule and for a fixed amount. See 
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). For instance, the holder of a $1,000 bond having a 6 
percent coupon will typically receive $30 twice a year. Preferred stock also comes with a coupon, 
but it takes the form of a dividend. See FLETCHER CYC. CORP., supra,§ 5299. As discussed in Part 
II., infra, dividends are not nearly as secure as interest payments, as they can be effectively 
discontinued by the board. 
10The terms of a preferred stock investment are established by its certificate of designation, 
which becomes part of the company's certificate of incorporation when executed. See Matulich v. 
Aegis Commc'ns Grp., Inc., 942 A.2d 596, 600 (Del. 2008). As such, the designated terms are 
subject to amendment in the same manner as any other provision of the certificate. See DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 242 (2013). 
11 See infra Part ll.C. 
12See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 7, at 1218-19. 
13 A recent, famous example is documented in Benchmark Capital Partners IV v. Vague, 
2002 WL 1732423 (Del. Ch. July I, 2002), ajj'd, 822 A.2d 396 (Del. 2003). In this case, 
Benchmark, the venture capitalist, saw its preferred stock subordinated, against its will, to a large 
subsequent preferred stock investment. See id. at *I. The certificate contained a provision to 
protect Benchmark against this circumstance in the certificate, but the provisions were poorly 
drafted and were evaded by the issuer. See id. at* I 0. See generally D. Gordon Smith, Independent 
Legal Significance, Good Faith, and the Interpretation of Venture Capital Contracts, 40 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 825 (2004) (describing the transaction involved in Benchmark). 
14509 A.2d 584, 594 (Del. Ch. 1986) (requiring the board to respect fiduciary duties toward 
preferred shareholders in allocating merger consideration between common and preferred). 
15 See infra Part II.E. 
16See infra notes 219-41 and accompanying text (comparing cases that suggest directors 
may rightfully favor common shareholders over preferred when faced with a conflict). 
17See, e.g., In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig. (Trados !), 2009 WL 2225958, at *7 (Del. Ch. 
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that are most often interpreted very narrowly, in favor of the common.18 It is 
no wonder, then, that investors have lost interest in preferred stock; if one 
must rely on covenants, better that they be included in an unalterable, legally 
enforceable debt contract. Preferred stock cannot survive if the board, acting 
on behalf of the common, can readily expropriate much or all of its value. 
This Article argues that preferred stock can regain its prominence if it 
evolves.19 Preferred shareholders need not rely on the law if they can obtain 
voting control over a majority of the seats of the board.20 This suggestion, in 
itself, is nothing new; preferred shareholders have long sought board control, 
only to find that the common won't give it up, and for good reason.21 What 
has not been tried-the novel solution offered here-is a division of board 
control between the two classes of equity in such a way to ensure their 
harmonious co-existence. 22 The common would retain full power over 
executive compensation, to ensure that the directors and officers are 
sufficiently incentivized to pursue profitable, risky investments. 23 The 
comn1on would also retain its merger veto and continue to be the 
beneficiaries of the board's fiduciary duties, so as to prevent the preferred 
from seeking to liquidate the firm or drain its assets at the expense of the 
common.24 The preferred would get operational control, and with it, domain 
over the mechanisms that today can be used by the common to exploit their 
July 24, 2009) (noting that "the rights and preferences of preferred stock are contractual in nature"). 
Trados I (and other cases that recite the same standard) uses the term "contractual" loosely, to refer 
to bargained-for provisions that specify rights with particularity-as opposed to rights that derive 
from the fiduciary duty of the board. /d.; see, e.g., Matulich v. Aegis Comm'ns Grp, 942 A.2d 596, 
600 (Del. 2008) (reciting same standard). Technically, the rights are not fully contractual; preferred 
shareholders who seek to enforce their bargains must proceed in equity under corporate law. See 
FLETCHER CYC. CORP., supra note 9, § 5295. Thus, in Delaware, disputes involving preferred 
shareholders are heard in the Court of Chancery. DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 10, § 341 (2013). 
18See infra Part ll.D. 
19See infra Part ll.F. 
20See infra Part lll.D. 
21See, e.g., Rothschild Int'l v. Leggett, 474 A.2d 133, 136 (Del. 1984) ("[M]inority stock 
interests may be eliminated by merger."). While preferred shareholders are always vulnerable to 
opportunism by the common, they at least have seniority within the capital structure. See FLETCHER 
CYC. CORP., supra note 9, §5299. As a result, the board can expropriate significant value, but it 
cannot easily strip the preferred entirely and retain value for the common. See, e.g., Equity-Linked 
Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1041-42 (Del. Ch. 1997) (describingtheconflictbetween 
the financial interests of holders of preferred and common stock where the company is on the brink 
of insolvency). Matters would be comparatively worse for the common if control were reversed. Cj 
id. at I 042 (stating that the board of a nearly insolvent company may impose economic risks on the 
preferred stock for the benefit of the common without breaching fiduciary duties because the 
preferred would always rather force a liquidation in such a case). Preferred shareholders with board 
control could divert most or all of the firm's cash flow into their own coffers. 
22 See infra Part lll.C. 
23 See infra notes 401-06 and accompanying text. 
24See infra Part ll.C.l. 
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senior partners in equity.25 Divided board control ("DBC") forces the 
common and the preferred to cooperate in efficiently managing the firm; 
each side understands that the alternative might lead to mutually assured 
destruction. 26 
One advantage of DBC over other reform agendas is that it can be 
implemented under current law, simply by negotiation.27 Other proposals for 
reviving preferred stock call for changes to the law. Fried and Ganor, for 
instance, suggest that common and preferred can co-exist with a change in 
Delaware law permitting certificate-level restrictions on directors' fiduciary 
duties.28 A recent paper by Professors Bratton and Wachter proposes a 
fiduciary duty of good faith owed by the board to the preferred, which would 
require (at a minimum) the board to seek to maximize not the common's 
wealth, but the total enterprise value of the firm.29 As meritorious as these 
suggestions might be, there does not seem to be a reform agenda anywhere 
on the horizon.30 By contrast, DBC achieves similar results by breaking free 
of the age-old assumption that voting rights, incentive alignment, and 
fiduciary expectations need be fused into one type of equity interest_3' 
Splitting them up wisely between different classes of equity can be more 
effective. 
25See infra notes 42-48 and accompanying text. 
26 See irifra notes 305-16 and accompanying text. 
27 See discussion infra pp. 215-16. 
28See Fried & Ganor, supra note 8, at 1024 (suggesting that investors may prefer "boards to 
be governed by some approach to fiduciary duties other than the courts' current ... approach, and 
that courts should allow parties, through charter provisions, to opt into more restrictive fiduciary 
duty rules that those currently offered"). They also suggest that boards be permitted only to favor 
one class of equity over another if such favoritism passes cost-benefit analysis. See id. at 1022-24. 
It is unclear how such a rule would be implemented. If the board's cost-benefit analysis is subjectto 
the business judgment rule, nothing will have been gained. On the other hand, one doubts that the 
corporate law courts are institutionally equipped to make such determinations. 
29William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A Theory Of Preferred Stock, 161 U. PA. L. 
REv. 1815, 1894 (2013) (arguing that enterprise value maximization presents a stronger case for 
fiduciary scrutiny than common equity value maximization in the preferred stock context). 
30See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Gaming Delaware, 40 WILLAMEITE L. REV. 853, 863-64 
(2004) (recounting the efforts by a prominent legal scholar over two decades to convince the courts 
of the need for "robust good-faith review of fmancial contracts" only to fmd that "nobody paid the 
slightest attention[,]" and asserting that Delaware is too concerned with pleasing its "customer base" 
of corporate executives to offer meaningful protections to preferred stock). 
31 This classic economic view has been called into question by recent scholarship. See, e.g., 
Frank Partnoy, Financial Innovation In Corporate Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 799, 807 (2006) (using 
option theory to argue that the allocation of control and fiduciary rights as between asset classes is 
arbitrary). This article takes no position on the proper distribution of rights as between the equity 
and other interests. See generally id. The suggestion here is that whatever portion of these 
protections are allocated to the equity, they should be segregated by type between preferred and 
common to counter-balance power between the two classes of equity. See id. 
2014 THE PERIL AND PROMISE OF PREFERRED STOCK 167 
II. THE PERILS OF PREFERRED STOCK 
A. Preferred Stock Basics 
Preferred stock is a class of stock that is senior to common equity in a 
firm's capital structure.32 If the corporation is liquidated, the preferred is paid 
off in full before the common can claim any assets. 33 The amount of money 
that constitutes full satisfaction of the preferred's fixed claim is called the 
liquidation preference. 34 The preferred's seniority also extends to current 
income, meaning that the common cannot be paid any dividends until the 
dividends promised to the preferred are paid in full. 35 Both the preference 
and the dividend-along with other contractual rights and protections, some 
of which will be discussed later in this Article-are determined by active 
bargaining between the investors and the issuing firm. 36 They are formally 
specified in a contract known as the certificate of designation/7 which 
becomes incorporated into the corporate charter when executed. 38 
As an illustration, consider a firm called Apoogle Oil capitalized with 
two classes of stock: one million shares of preferred stock that each carry a 
$50 liquidation preference and a dividend of $5 per year, and ten million 
32See FLETCHER CYC. CORP., supra note 9, § 5283. 
33See id. § 5303. 
34See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) ("A preferred shareholder's right, once the 
corporation is liquidated, to receive a specified distribution before common shareholders receive 
anything."). 
35See FLETCHER CYC. CORP., supra note 9, § 5299 ("The holders of preferred shares are 
entitled to be paid dividends, in accordance with the terms of their contract before any dividends can 
be paid to the holders of common stock." (footnotes omitted)). In theory, preferred stock dividends 
can be noncumulative, meaning that the preferred holders have no claim on unpaid (or less than fully 
paid) dividends from prior time periods. See id § 5446 (distinguishing cumulative from 
noncumulative preferred dividends). Thus, the board could pay dividends to the common while 
bypassing the preferred simply by ( 1) building up cash reserves by not paying any dividend for many 
time periods and (2) paying out that cash in the form of a special dividend to the common after 
paying to the preferred its promised dividend for that single time period. See id Absent 
extraordinary facts, a rational person would never purchase non-cumulative preferred, and hence it 
will be assumed that all preferred stock is cumulative. 
36See, e.g., Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 593 (Del. Ch. 1986) 
("[P]references and limitations associated with preferred stock exist only by virtue of an express 
provision (contractual in nature) creating such rights or limitations."). 
31See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § !51( d) (2011) ("The holders of the preferred ... shall 
be entitled to such rights upon the dissolution of, or upon any distribution of the assets of, the 
corporation as shall be stated in the certificate of incorporation or in the resolution or resolutions 
providing for the issue of such stock .... "). 
38See Elliot Assocs. v. Avatex, 715 A.2d 843, 843 n.3 (Del. 1998) ("When certificates of 
designations become effective, they constitute amendments to the certificate of incorporation so that 
the rights of preferred stockholders become part of the certificate of incorporation."). 
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shares of common stock initially purchased for $10 each. Assume that, three 
years later, Apoogle's net assets have grown to $200M. If the firm were 
liquidated at that point, the preferred shareholders collectively would collect 
$50M, and the common shareholders would receive $150M, or $15 per 
share. By contrast, if the firm's assets had shrunk to $60M, the preferred 
would still collect $50M, whereas the common shareholders would divide 
only the remaining $1OM. Each year, the firm would pay $5M per year in 
dividends to the preferred, meaning that profits earned in excess of that 
amount could be paid to the common in the form of dividends. 
The financial attributes of preferred stock resemble those of debt, 
because usually preferred stock entitles its owner to a fixed claim on the 
firm's assets along with a periodic yield. A liquidation preference is 
analogous to the principal a debtor owes to a creditor;39 the preferred 
dividend is analogous to the interest a debtor pays on that principal.40 Both 
types of fixed claims have limited upside, meaning that their maximum 
return on investment is pre-defined, usually as the interest or dividend to be 
paid.41 Returning to the Apoogle Oil example, suppose that in ten years, the 
company's assets and profits have grown so vast that the firm is worth one 
trillion dollars. The preferred shareholders would still have a liquidation 
preference of$50M, and they would have been paid $50M in dividends over 
that time period. Meanwhile, the remaining $999 .99B in value would go to 
the common. If Apoogle had issued debt instead of preferred stock, the 
finance would be unchanged: the creditors would have received $1OOM, and 
the common would be worth very nearly a trillion dollars. 
Preferred stock also resembles debt in that both instruments are 
vulnerable to exploitation by the common. By their nature, fixed claims lose 
value when subject to increased risk, whereas equity tends to benefit from 
additional risk.42 Thus, ifthe common shareholders can impel the firm to 
take on additional risk, the value of their investments will appreciate, at the 
expense of the fixed claimants. 43 A bit of arithmetic and a hypothetical help 
illustrate the point. Suppose a firm, capitalized with 75 percent fixed 
39See FLETCHER CYC. CoRP., supra note 9, § 5303 (describing liquidation rights of 
preferred shareholders). 
40See id. § 5291 (distinguishing preferred stockholders from creditors). 
41 See id. § 5303 ("[H]olders of preferred shares have the same, and no greater right, to share 
in the assets as the holders of common shares .... "). 
42Robert J. Rhee, Fiduciary Exemption for Public Necessity: Shareholder Profit, Public 
Good and The Hobson's Choice During a National Crisis, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 661, 721 n.369 
(2010) (discussing how increases in firm riskiness benefits equity and harms debt, and how 
therefore the interests of equity and debt holders are often in conflict). 
43See id 
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financing (i.e., debt or preferred) and 25 percent common equity, is 
presented with an opportunity to bet all of its assets on a coin flip. This bet 
would be a great deal for the common: while they could be wiped out (along 
with the debt) if the firm loses the bet, they would make 5 times their money 
if it wins.44 Assuming that the coin is fair, the expected gain to equity from 
merely placing the bet would be 250 percent.45 In fact, at this leverage ratio, 
equity would come out ahead even if the coin were loaded so as to give the 
firm only a 25 percent chance of winning.46 Thus, equity can profit by 
causing a company to make knowingly terrible investments, so long as the 
potential upside is sufficiently high.47 This opportunistic gain, of course, 
comes at the expense of the fixed claims, which bear most of the downside 
risk but have no claim on the winnings; in this example, the fixed claims 
would lose half their value even assuming a fair coin.48 
Thus, both debt and preferred seek to protect their claims on the firm's 
assets against opportunism by the common. Their ability to do so differs 
greatly.49 Creditors have access to contractual remedies, which means they 
can regulate the firm's behavior with bargained-for covenants in the debt 
contract. 5° In most cases, these contracts are written so that the outstanding 
principal and interest on the loan becomes immediately due if any covenant 
is breached. 51 Both common equity and management fear this circumstance, 
44The arithmetic works as follows. Suppose the company has $100M in assets, meaning 
that it has $75M in debt and $25M in equity. !fit wins the bet, its assets will increase to $200M-a 
gain that goes only to the equity, since the debt's claim is fixed. Thus, the equity would now be 
worth $125M, which is 5 times its original value. 
45 After the coin flip, the equity would be equally likely to be worth nothing or $I 25M, 
meaning that its expected value before the flip (but after the bet) would be $62.5M, 2 Y:z times its 
original value of .25X. 
46In this case, the expected value of the equity would be 0.25*12.5M = 3.125M, which still 
represents a healthy 25 percent gain. 
47See, e.g., CreditLyonnais Nederland, N.Y. v. PatheCommc'ns Corp., 1991 WL277613, 
at *24-*25 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991), reprinted in 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1099, 1155 (1992) (noting 
that the decisions of a board representing only shareholders' interests will be inefficient for the frrm 
as a whole). 
48 After the coin flip, the fixed claim would be equally likely to be worth nothing, or retain 
its original value, meaning that its expected value after the bet but before the flip would fall to 
$37.5M. To be sure, the market value of the debt might slightly rise if the frrm won the bet, because 
the debt would be secured by more assets and would therefore be somewhat less risky. This 
magnitude of this effect, though, is insignificant compared to the massive increase in risk occasioned 
by the bet itself. 
49See infra notes 50-54 and accompanying text. 
50See JEFFREY J. HAAS, CORPORATE FINANCE IN A NUTSHELL 317, 317 (2d ed. 2010) 
("[A]n indenture sets forth the issuer's promise to repay debt holders .... [which is] fully 
enforceable ... as it was given by the issuer in a bargained for exchange in return for the loaned 
funds."). 
51 See, e.g., REVISED MODEL SIMPLIFIED INDENTURE§§ 6.0 I (3), 6.02 ( defming "Event of 
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as firms usually lack the liquidity to satisfy the accelerated obligation and 
thus reorganization becomes likely.52 As Professors Baird and Rasmussen 
have observed, the covenants included in revolving lines of credit are often 
so detailed and firm-specific that they confer upon the creditor bank an 
effective veto over excessive risk-taking by the debtor firm. 53 While debt 
covenants cannot render creditors completely invulnerable to opportunism, 
they are usually at least somewhat effective in protecting the underlying 
value of debt claims. 54 
Preferred stock, by contrast, must rely on much weaker remedies. 55 To 
be sure, preferred stock typically issues with covenants similar to those 
included in bond indentures, but they are not backed by the power of 
accelerated repayment of principal and interest. 56 Dividends promised to 
preferred stock can be retracted, and the preferred generally cannot force 
repayment of the principal in the event that a covenant has been breached. 57 
The preferred can roughly approximate accelerated principal repayment by 
obtaining a promise from the firm to redeem the stock if any covenants are 
breached/8 but redemptions cannot be relied upon in a pinch-they are 
subject to statutory restrictions and are regulated less by contract than by 
equitable principles of corporate law.59 Ultimately, the preferred 
shareholders, as shareholders, must seek legal remedies by means of actions 
Default" as including failure to comply with any agreement "in the Securities or this Indenture," and 
providing that the indenture trustee or holders of at least 25 percent of the outstanding principal may, 
upon an event of default, declare the principal and unpaid interest to be immediately due and 
payable); Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 7, at 1227-28 (noting that the basic structure of a loan 
agreement includes a set of covenants and a provision that defmes covenant breaches as default 
events that permit the creditor to demand repayment). 
52 See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 7, at 1230-35. 
53/d. 
54 As Baird and Rasmussen note, private lenders can obtain much greater protection, because 
they can tailor the covenants much more narrowly to the specific risks presented by the borrower. 
See id. at 1231-32. However, even generic fmancial covenants, such as maximum leverage ratios, 
can discipline the behavior of debtor firms. See, e.g., M. Todd Henderson, Paying CEOs in 
Bankruptcy: Executive Compensation When Agency Costs Are Low, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1543, 
1557 & n. 74 (describing studies demonstrating that covenants on publicly issued debt can be used 
by vulture investors to veto unpalatable managerial decisions). 
55 See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text. 
56 See HAAs, supra note 50, at 416-17. 
57 See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 29, at 1861 ("Promises to pay dividends on stock or 
redeem stock for cash cannot be made absolute in the same sense as promises to pay interest and to 
repay principal on a bond."). 
58 See HAAS, supra note 50, at 423. 
59 See, e.g., SV Inv. Partners v. Thoughtworks, Inc. (Thoughtworks 1), 7 A.3d 973,988 (Del. 
Ch. 2010), aff'd 37 A.3d 205 (Del. 2011) (declining to enforce a mandatory preferred stock 
redemption provision when the board determined that there were no funds legally available with 
which to redeem); infra Part II.D. 
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in corporate law.60 In board-friendly jurisdictions such as Delaware, this 
operates as a powerful practical disadvantage.61 While the common 
shareholders occasionally win when taking action against the board, the 
preferred nearly always lose. 62 
What preferred stock can obtain, in theory, is control over the board. 63 
Indeed, board control is even better than a contract remedy; investors would 
have no need to go to court if the board were to do its bidding.64 However, 
the preferred rarely gets control, as control is generally considered to be 
more valuable to the common.65 While the preferred can suffer a loss if the 
board, favoring the common, causes the firm to increase its risk, the inverse 
situation-in which the board does the preferred's bidding-can wipe out the 
common almost in its entirety,66 leaving the common with barely a cent.67 
60Th is is not to say that the court's decisions cannot be grounded on contract principles. See 
Rothschild Int'l Corp. v. Liggett Grp. Inc., 474 A.2d 133, 136 (Del. 1984). In fact, as described 
below, courts usually look to the terms of the preferred stock contract in deciding cases. See infra 
Part TI.D. But the corporate law foundations mean that a court can depart from the terms of a 
contract (or at least alter the interpretation of the contract) on the basis of equitable principles. See 
discussion infra Part TI.C.2. 
61 The last significant victory for preferred shareholders in the Court of Chancery was the 
1997 case of Orban v. Field, 1997 WL 153831, at *9 (Del. Ch. Apr. I, 1997), reprinted in 23 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 335, 352 (1998). 
62See, e.g., Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1059 (choosing the 
wealth maximization of common stock over the liquidation preference of preferred shares). 
63Corporation law affirmatively permits voting rights to be parceled out among classes of 
stock according to terms established in the certificate of incorporation. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8, § 15l(a) (2011) ("[Each class of stock] may have such voting powers, full orlimited, or no 
voting powers . . . as shall be stated and expressed in the certificate of incorporation or of any 
amendment thereto .... "). 
64 Assuming, that is, that directors are faithful agents of the majority who elected them. As 
Air Products discovered in its attempt to acquire Airgas, this is not always the case. See Air Prods., 
Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A. 3d 48, 128 (Del. Ch. 2011) (noting that the three directors nominated by 
Air Products and elected in a subsequent proxy contest voted with the incumbent board members to 
reject Air Products' offer to maintain Airgas' poison pill). 
65 See Richard A. Booth, Who Owns a Corporation and Who Cares, 77 CHJ.-KENT L. REV. 
147, 166 (2001). 
66The asymmetry between these situations is the result of the financial seniority of the 
preferred over the common. See FLETCHER CYC. CORP., supra note 9, § 5299. For instance, a 
preferred-controlled board need not concoct risk-exposure schemes to profit at the common's 
expense. The board can simply sell the firm's assets to fund a buyback or dividend for the preferred. 
See, e.g., In re Primedia Inc. Derivative Litig., 910 A.2d 248, 261 n.45 (Del. Ch. 2006) (not 
dismissing a derivative suit alleging self-interest by a preferred-controlled board that sold assets-
and crippled the future prospects of the company and the common-in order to redeem preferred 
stock). Alternatively, the preferred could simply bury the common under a mountain of preferences. 
This ruthlessly direct oppression is unavailable to the common, because the preferred have first 
claim to the firm's assets. See FLETCHER CYC. CORP., supra note 9, § 5303. 
67In Delaware, a preferred-dominated board would likely be in breach of duty if it wiped out 
the common completely. See Trados I, 2009 WL 2225958, at *7 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009) (holding 
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The board's fiduciary duties-which always run to the common68-may offer 
but a token resistance against gradual, systematic looting.69 
That venture capitalists often obtain control rights for their preferred is 
the exception that proves the rule.70 The venture capitalist ("VC") has an 
unusual amount of leverage over an entrepreneur (who holds common) 
desperate for funding that cannot be obtained elsewhere on better terms.71 
The VC may insist on control rights, and the common may be in no position 
to object. The transfer of control is also facilitated by the unique economics 
of the VC business.72 The entrepreneur need not fear that the VC will drain 
the cash of a successful startup/3 because it is far more profitable to sell that 
cash flow to the public in the form of a public offering of common equity74-
and also profitable in the long term to share the proceeds of that sale with the 
entrepreneur.75 When these unique circumstances are not present, control 
that the board arguably breached its duties when approving a merger in which the merger 
consideration would go entirely to the preferred, leaving the common with "the worst possible 
outcome for the common stockholders"). Trados I gives no indication, though, that the board would 
have been liable had it reserved a pittance for the common. Id 
68/d at *7 (reciting Delaware authorities requiring the board to favor the interests of the 
common over the preferred where they conflict). 
69Indeed, it is likely that preferred-favoring decisions of disinterested, preferred-elected 
directors will be protected by the business judgment rule, so long as the directors remain formally 
independent. See, e.g., Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53,65 (Del. 1989) 
(holding that a director's nomination and election by a powerful shareholder "alone did not make him 
an interested director"). In Trados I, Chancellor Chandler wondered aloud whether the Fairchild 
Camera rule would be softened when the directors represent shareholders with "direct fmancial 
interest[s]" in a transaction. 2009 WL 2225958, at *10 n.43. For the affUTI1ative case, he could 
point only to a little-known Court of Chancery opinion, Goldman v. Pogo. com, Inc., 2002 WL 
1358760, at *3 (Del. Ch. June 14, 2002). The authority of Pogo. com does not stand well against the 
longstanding, authoritative Supreme Court precedent ofF airchild Camera. See generally Fairchild 
Camera, 569 A.2d 53. 
70See Fried & Ganor, supra note 8, at 987-88. 
71 See id (describing how VCs usually wield effective control over the board in companies 
they finance). 
72See id at 972. 
73In unsuccessful startups, the VC usually walks away with most, if not all, of the residual 
assets, by virtue of its liquidation preference. See Manuel A. Utset, Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic 
Behavior & Venture Survival: A Theory of Venture Capital-Financed Firms, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 45, 
68 (2002). Entrepreneurs are, by definition, risk-seeking; they accept the possibility of losing their 
shirts in an unsuccessful venture for the prospect of huge profits if the venture achieves success. See 
id. at 81. 
74See Fried & Ganor, supra note 8, at 997 n.88. This assumes that there even is a positive 
cash flow. In many cases, such as the recent IPO of Groupon, the public is willing to pay richly for 
the opportunity to invest in a fllTI1 with negative cash flow. See Alistair Barr & Clare Baldwin, 
Groupon's /PO Biggest by U.S. Web Company Since Google, REUTERS (Nov. 4, 2011), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/ll/04/us-groupon-idUSTRE7A3520201111 04. 
75VC fUTI1S, are, after all, repeat players. See generally Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Market for 
Innovation in the United States and Japan: Venture Capital and the Comparative Corporate 
Governance Debate, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 865,870 (1997). A fUT11 that hoarded the IPO proceeds for 
2014 THE PERIL AND PROMISE OF PREfERRED STOCK 173 
rights will not readily transfer.76 Fixed claim financing in the form of 
preferred stock is vanishingly rare. 77 
In short, the one feature that could protect preferred stock is the one 
that is generally out of its reach under current practice. This Article returns 
to preferred board control in Part II, which develops a system for control 
transfer that protects all parties. 78 But first, it is useful to consider why we 
should want to save preferred stock, and examine in more detail the dangers 
from which it needs to be saved. 
B. The Utility Of Preferred Stock 
In most situations, investors prefer enforceable legal rights over mere 
promises. However, the inability for fixed-claim financers to force 
liquidation can be efficient and lead to higher overall returns for firms with 
highly variable or unpredictable cash flow. 79 Over time, these firms can be 
highly profitable, but only if they can survive their lean years-periods 
during which they lose money, exhaust their liquid assets, and are unable to 
pay the yield on their fixed-claim financing. 80 In such cases, debt financing 
renders the firm and its investors vulnerable to opportunistic creditors, who 
can force the company into a bankruptcy and seize its equity during 
reorganization. 81 This costly and ex ante inefficient process can be avoided 
by financing with preferred stock, since the company cannot be forced into 
default.82 It can simply wait out the lean years by suspending its dividend, 
resuming it (and paying arrears) upon regaining profitability. It is for this 
reason that venture capitalists rely so heavily on preferred stock financing: 
they value the ability to prevent the company from filing for Chapter 11.83 
In this sense, preferred stock acts as a type of firm-level "automatic 
stabilizer." In macroeconomics, that term refers to fiscal policies with 
itself-which, in theory, it could do with control over the board-would quickly frnd itselflacking 
in new investment opportunities from other entrepreneurs. 
16See Fried & Ganor, supra note 8, at 987-88. 
77 See id. at 981-82. 
78See infra Part II.G. 
19See generally HAAS, supra note 50, at 416. 
80See Jonathan C. Lipson, Governance in the Breach: Controlling Creditor Opportunism, 
84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1035, 1037-46 (2011) (commenting on creditor opportunism with respect to 
struggling firms). 
81See id 
82See RICHARD A. Boom, FINANCING THE CORPORATION§ 6:5 (2013). 
83See Baird & Rasumussen, supra note 7, at 1218 ("[A] venture capitalist [who] want[s] to 
prevent a business from filing for Chapter II, but otherwise enjoy all the usual attributes of a 
creditor [does so by] becom[ing] a preferred shareholder and tak[ing] steps to ensure that no other 
creditors of any consequence come into being."). In the absence of creditors, a business cannot file 
for bankruptcy. See id 
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naturally counter-cyclical effects; for instance, when workers are laid off as 
an economy begins to slide into recession, the payment of unemployment 
benefits or provision of food stamps immediately provides a fiscal stimulus 
to slow the recession's progress. 84 Preferred stock works analogously at the 
level of the firm: as liquidity decreases, financing commitments 
automatically loosen so as to prevent a liquidity failure. 85 By contrast, debt is 
pro-cyclical. A faltering debtor firm is likely to breach a maintenance 
covenant, and trigger creditors' control rights-rights that can be used to 
push the firm into a bankruptcy event. 86 By reducing expected bankruptcy 
costs, preferred stock should increase investor yields, as compared to debt, 
for risky companies. 
Sadly, the automatic stabilizing feature has a significant downside: its 
issuance signals to the market that management believes the firm's expected 
bankruptcy costs to be high.87 Otherwise, the firm would simply finance 
with a lower-yield instrument like debt. An adverse selection feedback loop 
thus arises: by issuing preferred stock, firms signal that they are uncertain of 
their future prospects, which in turn causes investors to demand an even 
higher yield. The result is that preferred stock-though low-cost in theory-
ends up being a high-cost financing mechanism for companies with 
uncertain outlooks. As explained in the next Section, this particular 
disadvantage of preferred stock is critical to its undoing. 88 
840n the effectiveness of macroeconomic automatic stabilizers, see Xavier Debrun & 
Radhicka Kapoor, Fiscal Policy and Macroeconomic Stability: Automatic Stabilizers Work, Always 
and Everywhere (Int'l Monetary Fund Working Paper 10/111, 2010), available at 
http://www .elibrary.imf.org/view/IMFOO I /I 0922-9781455200702/10922-9781455200702/10922-
9781455200702 AOOI.xml. 
85See T;;m Drinkard, A Primer on Preferred Stocks, INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 9, 2012), 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/stocks/06/preferredstock.asp. 
86 See Lipson, supra note 80, at I 040 ("[ C]ontrolling creditors may replace management of a 
distressed firm with professional 'turnaround experts' whose loyalties may not run to the firm .... "). 
87It is important to note that expected bankruptcy costs depend heavily on the firm's 
corporate, non-beta risk. See, e.g., MICHAEL C. EHRHARDT & EUGENE F. BRIGHAM, CORPORATE 
FINANCE: A FOCUSED APPROACH 219-56 (4th ed. 2011) (discussing risk, return and the capital 
assert pricing model). Bankruptcy costs can be modeled as the inverse of a deep in the money put 
option: the value is zero unless the firm performs very poorly. See id. Just as volatility increases the 
value of a put option, so too does riskiness-i.e., volatility of firm performance-increase the 
expected bankruptcy costs. See id. Thus, the CAPM thesis that securities prices depend only on 
beta depends on an assumption of zero bankruptcy costs. See id. at 239-43. 
88See infra Part II. C. 
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C. Opportunistic Exploitation of Preferred Stock, Continued 
Part A discussed one way that common equity can exploit fixed 
claimants: increasing the riskiness of the corporation's operations.89 Betting 
on a coin flip is a largely hypothetical example,90 but leveraged 
recapitalizations91 and asset substitutions92 are quite real. As noted above, 
covenants in debt contracts can offer some protection against over-
leveraging, and to a lesser extent, against asset substitution.93 Preferred stock 
89See supra Part II.A. 
90But it is not entirely hypothetical. MF Global, for instance, went bankrupt precisely 
because it bet the company on a hunch that European sovereign debt-which had been trading at a 
discount to par value-would rebound in price. See Rena S. Miller, The MF Global Bankruptcy, 
Missing Customer Funds, and Proposals for Reform, FED'N OF AM. SCIENTISTS, 1-2 (Aug. I, 
2013), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc!R4209l.pdf. Instead, the bonds continued to lose value, 
and soon the value of the bond portfolio was dwarfed by the debt the company had incurred to 
purchase it. See id. 
91 In a leveraged recapitalization, the fum replaces most of its equity financing with debt, 
thus dramatically reducing the debt's equity cushion. See Mark G. Metzler, The Leveraged Recap: A 
Tool to Achieve Liquidity and Retain Control, KREISCHER MILLER (Aug. 5, 2013), 
http://www.kmco.com/articles/looking-forward/the-leveraged-recap-a-tool-to-achieve-liquidity-and-
retain-control/. The market value of the existing bonds can drop precipitously, because the 
recapitalization greatly increases firm's credit risk. See id. In the wake of the takeover boom of the 
1980s, bondholders insisted on covenants to protect against increases in leverage, but by the 2000s, 
the lesson had been forgotten: buyers were once again lining up to buy so-called "covenant-lite" 
debt, which lacked such protections. See Tim Cross, Covenant-Lite Leveraged 
Loan Volume Soars To New Record, FORBES (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/spl 
everage/20 13/08/14/covenant-lite-leveraged-loan-volume-soars-to-new-record/. 
92In an asset substitution, the firm trades a safe, predictable cash flow for a riskier, more 
speculative cash flow. See WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE 283 (Foundation Press, 
7th ed. 20 12). A recent example of an asset substitution was the plan by Hewlett Packard, under the 
direction of its now-deposed CEO Leo Apotheker, to sell its safe, low-margin personal computing 
business and purchase a data analytics company called Autonomy, which was growing rapidly but 
had inconsistent cash flows and competed in a rapidly evolving marketplace against much larger 
competitors such as Oracle. See Michael J. de Ia Merced, Hewlett-Packard Weighs 
Deal Options, N.Y. nMES DEALBOOK (Sept. 21, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/09/ 
21/hewlett-packard-weighs-deal-options/? _r=O (describing Apotheker's strategy). While 
shareholders objected to Mr. Apotheker's plans and forced him out as CEO, that was largely due to a 
perception that he had massively overpaid for Autonomy and had no clear strategic direction for the 
company. See id. HP bondholders were surely even more furious, though they remained silent 
(most likely because they had no control or influence over the company's strategic decision-making). 
93 See supra Part I. Public debt very rarely, if ever, protects against asset substitution. See 
BRATTON, supra note 92, at 330-31 (noting that "there does not appear to be such a thing as a 
meaningful affurnative promise to invest capital competitively at an acceptable risk level"). It is not 
only difficult to defme, but could be positively harmful: constraints on management's ability to 
refocus the company's strategic direction could invite sclerosis. /d. Private debt, on the other hand, 
can easily confer veto power over asset substitution transactions, because banks are closer to the 
operation of the business and can make decisions rapidly. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 7, at 
1227 (observing that "the complete control the lender has over the debtor's cash flow gives the 
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agreements also include covenants, but they are less effective because they 
cannot be as easily enforced.94 Even for preferred stock, however, risk-
seeking behavior by equity is not necessarily fatal. After all, most managers 
are risk-averse, as they hold much of their personal wealth in their firms' 
common equity, and can be expected to favor risk enhancement only when 
the gains are very large.95 
The common can also exploit fixed claims by forcing them to give up 
their securities at heavy discounts.96 The temptation to do so is strongest 
after a rapid decrease in a firm's cost of capital, as might occur when a firm 
emerges from a period of financial stress. The newly liquid fum likely wants 
to eliminate its high yield financing obligations. This, in itself, is 
unremarkable: firms frequently borrow money at a lower coupon rate and 
self-tender for their outstanding securities, which trade at a premium to par 
value because their high yield is no longer accompanied by as much credit 
risk.97 But who wants to a pay a premium? The windfall for the firm comes 
from finding a way to squeeze out the fixed claims at par value or below-
and doing so without dissipating its gains in transaction costs.98 
Preferred stock is a particularly attractive target. Because it issues at a 
higher yield than debt, as described above,99 fums can realize especially large 
profits by squeezing it out. At the same time, case law has rendered it 
increasingly simple and inexpensive to redeem preferred stock at sub-market 
prices, as will be discussed shortly. 100 Notice that the preferred cannot easily 
be compensated for squeeze out risk with a higher yield ab initio. 101 To the 
contrary, the higher yield will simply increase the squeeze out incentive, and 
when transaction costs are taken into account, it might even prove to be self-
defeating.102 
lender veto power over every course of action, whether internal to the corporation or outside it"). 
94See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. 
95See id. Note, however, that the still-increasing prevalence of risk-seeking hedge funds 
can change this equation. See Dan Barufaldi, Hedge Funds: Risks, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www 
.investopedia.cornluniversitylhedge-fund/risks.asp (last visited Feb. 3, 2014). 
96 See infra Part II. C.!. 
97Sometimes issuers include call options on debt or preferred stock so as to cap the 
premiums that must be paid to retire those obligations, but such options, of course, are not free. See 
JAMES C. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 595-97 (Prentice Hall, 12th ed. 
200 I). A firm that wants to redeem its securities must compensate investors for that privilege in the 
form of higher yield. /d. 
98See id. 
99See supra Part ll.B. 
100See infra Part II. C. I. 
101See Avatex, 715 A.2d at 846-47. 102 See infra notes 196-97 and accompanying text. Consider the following illustration. 
Suppose five years ago, a firm issued preferred stock carrying an aggregate par value of$1 OOM at a 
l 0 percent dividend. Since then, the frrrn's fmances have improved and the preferred now trades at 
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This court's facilitation of this second form of exploitation decouples 
the risk of preferred stock from its reward/03 thus jeopardizing its viability as 
an investment. A preferred shareholder will only assume the risk of losing 
part or all of her principal investment (in the event of insolvency) if she can 
expect to reap the benefits of the high yield in the event that the firm 
survives. If the firm can diminish that yield without adequate compensation, 
then the investor can lose but never win, and she will not put her money at 
risk. Worse, preferred investors apparently cannot even rely on the honor 
and integrity of directors or executives who promise not to act 
opportunistically, because the case law suggests that the board may actually 
have a fiduciary duty to exploit the preferred to the benefit of the common 
whenever possible. 104 
At this point, it will be helpful to lend concreteness to the discussion 
by describing how the preferred can be redeemed against its will. 
1. The White-Out Merger 
The most basic technique for eliminating an expensive commitment to 
preferred stock is by merging the company into another. 105 A merger permits 
a voting majority to force the minority to exchange their investments for the 
consideration set forth in the merger agreement. 106 Thus can the common 
equity force the preferred to redeem their shares for inferior value, so long as 
the common has the majority of voting power. 107 These might be usefully 
called white-out mergers, so as to (1) distinguish them from cash-out 
mergers, in which controlling common shareholders liquidate the equity of 
minority common shareholders108 and (2) emphasize that these transactions 
an aggregate market value of $11OM. This implies that the finn would realize a net present benefit 
of $1OM by borrowing at its current cost of capital and redeeming the preferred at its par value-a 
course of action that would be unprofitable if the transaction costs of forcing the redemption were 
$15M. The preferred shareholders would thus continue to enjoy their supra-market yield. Suppose, 
however, that the investors had originally demanded an additional I percent yield to compensate 
them for squeeze out risk. In that case, the stock would now carry a yield of II percent, and it might 
trade at an aggregate value of $120M. Now the squeeze out would be worth the finn's trouble, and 
the preferred would be redeemed at the $1OOM par value. Having bargained for a higher yield, the 
investors would perversely have less to show for it. 
103See infra Part TI.C.l. 
104See infra Part TI.E. 
105 See, e.g., A vat ex, 715 A.2d at 849 (discussing a merger in this context). 
106See, e.g., id. at 849-50 (discussing the merger and effect on the preferred stock). 
107See, e.g., id. (discussing adverse effects on the First Series Preferred). 
108 A cash-out merger is a "merger in which shareholders of the target company must accept 
cash for their shares." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, (9th ed. 2009). 
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are undertaken specifically to erase preference rights (both as to liquidation 
and dividends) from the company's capital structure. 109 
A well-known white-out merger was attempted by A vatex, a 
struggling company with a class of preferred stock on top of a layer of 
ordinary equity that had become essentially worthless. 110 A vatex created a 
new wholly owned subsidiary, Xetava, into which it planned to merge. 111 
The merger agreement between the two companies called for A vatex 
common and preferred stock both to be converted into Xetava common 
stock. 112 Then, after the merger, Xetava would change its name back to 
A vatex. 113 The entire purpose of the transaction was to convert preferred 
stock into common so that the preferred shareholders would have to share 
their equity value with the common. In other words, the liquidation 
preference was to be erased. As an added benefit, A vatex would have been 
able to write itself a new certificate-the one it drafted for Xetava-since its 
certificate was eliminated when the original A vatex ceased to exist. 114 
The most notable aspect of the Avatex litigation case was that the 
white-out merger nearly succeeded, even though the preferred was seemingly 
well protected by contract. 115 Indeed, the preferred had bargained for a 
certificate provision requiring A vatex to obtain supermajority approval from 
the preferred before effecting any "amendment, alteration or repeal, whether 
by merger, consolidation or otherwise, of any of the provisions of the 
Restated Certificate of Incorporation . . . which would materially and 
adversely affect any right, preference, privilege or voting power" of the 
preferred. 116 At trial, however, Vice Chancellor Lamb disregarded the 
italicized phrases as irrelevant to the case. 117 In his view, the preferred did 
not suffer any harm from any sort of" amendment, alteration, or repeal" of 
the certificate. 118 Rather, he viewed the conversion of the preferred into 
Xetava stock-which was, of course, effected by and inseparable from the 
merger-as the source of injury. 119 Since the certificate said nothing about 
conversion, he saw no reason to enjoin the transaction. 120 
109See Avatex, 715 A.2d at 849 (stating the purpose of effectuating the merger). 
110The white-out transaction was described by the Delaware Supreme Court inAvatex. Id 
at 845-47. 
111Id at 844. 
ll2Id 
113See Avatex, 715 A.2d at 844. 
114Id at 844. 
115See id at 854. 
116See id at 845 (emphasis in original). 
117Avatex, 715 A.2d at 847. 
118Id (emphasis in original). 
119 As Chancellor Allen observed in Warner Communications Inc. v. Chris-Craft Industries, 
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On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed and remanded, 121 but 
on grounds so formalistic that the preferred's victory was almost 
serendipitous. Chief Justice Veasey reasoned that the word "consolidation" 
in the supermajority voting provision implied that the displacement of 
A vatex's certificate in the Xetava merger constituted an "amendment, 
alteration or repeal." 122 Otherwise, the word "consolidation" would have 
been surplusage, since it is impossible for a consolidation to affect a 
certificate except by displacement. 123 Such peripatetic reasoning may have 
helped the court arrive at the right outcome for the facts before it, but it also 
established a surreal precedent: the preferred were saved from exploitation 
by a merger transaction only because the certificate was drafted also to 
protect against consolidations. 124 The parties probably did not bargain 
over--or even give any thought to--including the word "consolidation," 
because there exists no legally consequential distinction between mergers 
and consolidations. 125 The certificate could easily have been drafted to 
protect against "amendment, alteration or repeal, whether by merger or 
otherwise," and the meaning would have been the same. 126 Yet the preferred 
might have lost the case had it used this slightly more succinct, semantically 
equivalent formulation. Chalk one up for lawyers' lists. 
Inc.-a case on which the Vice Chancellor heavily relied-the certificate modification and the stock 
conversion are both "necessitated by" and "flows from" the merger itself. 583 A.2d 962, 968 (Del. 
Ch. 1989), reprinted in 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1167, 1179 (1990). They are distinct consequences of 
that merger, not distinct actions having independent existence. See id. 
120See id. 
121Avatex, 715 A.2d at 855. 
122 /d. at 851. 
123 See id. at 854. 
124/d. at 855. The term "consolidation" is a quirk of the Delaware merger statute. DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (a) (20 11 ). Consolidations are functionally identical to mergers, in that both 
types of transactions involve the combination of two corporations into one. See id. In a "merger," 
one of the merging entities survives in name and absorbs the other; in a consolidation, the surviving 
corporation is a newly incorporated company. See id. No such distinction exists in modern 
corporation statutes, like the Model Business Corporations Act, because nothing of substance turns 
on whether a transaction is styled as a "merger" or a "consolidation." See id. ( defming mergers and 
consolidations). 
125See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2011); Avatex, 715 A.2d at 854-55. The dual 
terminology of mergers and consolidations is a pure administrative formality, existing only to specify 
what papers must be filed with the office of the Delaware Secretary of State. See DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8, § 251 (c) (20 11) (requiring the merging parties to file a certificate that, in the case of a merger, 
must include "such amendments or changes in the certificate of incorporation of the surviving 
corporation ... to be effected by the merger," and in the case of a consolidation, must include 
"certificate of incorporation of the resulting corporation"). Nowhere else does the DGCL distinguish 
mergers from consolidations, let alone subject them to different legal rules. 
126See Avatex, 715 A.2d at 845, 851. 
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The Avatex litigation vividly illustrates the fragility of preferred stock 
contracting. 127 Both opinions interpreted the certificate of designation 
without even contemplating the parties' intentions, or even whether their 
interpretations made any real-world sense. 128 The Vice Chancellor rested on 
a supposed technical distinction between stock conversion and certificate 
amendment129 to which the preferred could never possibly have assented. 
Almost the entire value of preferred stock lies in its preference;130 it is 
inconceivable that the preferred bargained for protection against preference-
eroding amendments but traded away a protection against preference-
destroying conversion. Chief Justice Veasey's interpretation rested on the 
use of one boilerplate provision over a slightly different formulation-a 
selection more likely made by chance than by choice. 131 In the end, the 
white-out merger was enjoined, 132 but the case should not have been close. 
That the preferred ultimately eked out a narrow win inspires little confidence 
in adequacy of contract as a protection against senior-to-junior wealth 
transfers. 
2. The Dormant Firm 
If the whiting out of a liquidation preference is the worst possible 
outcome for the preferred, being frozen inside a dormant firm ranks a close 
second. Freezes often occur when the book value of common equity falls 
below zero. 133 At that point, the firm will not be sold or liquidated, as neither 
action would yield anything for the common. 134 Instead, the board will put 
the comatose firm on life support and try to keep it breathing as long as 
possible. 135 After all, miracles do happen: its assets could appreciate to a 
value greater than the liquidation preference, at which point the common 
would spring back to life. Perhaps another firm will infringe or need to 
license one of its patents; maybe shifting patterns of land use will bring 
121See Bratton, supra note I, at 893 (recognizing preferred stock's history of contract 
failure). 
128SeeAvatex, 715 A.2d at 852-53; Harbor Fin. Partners Ltd. v. Butler, 1998 WL294011, at 
*8 (Del. Ch. June 3, 1998), reprinted in 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 248, 262 (1999), rev'd sub nom. Elliot 
Assocs. v. Avatex Corp., 715 A.2d 843 (Del. 1998). 
129Harbor, 1998 WL 294011, at *9. AsAvatex illustrates, this distinction does not hold up 
under scrutiny. See Avatex, 715 A.2d at 854. 
130See Bratton, supra note I, at 925. 
131 See Avatex, 715 A.2d at 855. 
132Seeid. 
Ill See Guhan Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 YALE L.J. 2, 32 (2005). 
134See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 29, at 1889. 
m See id. at 1886. 
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value to its real estate. Improbable? Of course, but life support has no 
downside for the cornmon. 136 All the costs are borne by the frozen-in 
preferred. 137 Meanwhile, even as the firm lingers on indefinitely, the 
common may be concocting a plan to liberate whatever assets remain.138 
Preferred shareholders are not entirely defenseless against dormant 
firms, because they can and do bargain for mandatory redemption 
provisions.139 Unfortunately, redemption provisions often fail when they are 
most needed, as illustrated by the recent case of SV Investment Partners, 
LLC v. Thoughtworks, Inc. 140 There, SV Investment Partners (SVIP) made a 
venture capital investment in Thoughtworks, obtaining convertible preferred 
stock with a mandatory redemption option. 141 The certificates stated that if 
Thoughtworks had not gone public after five years, the preferred holders 
were "entitled to require [Thoughtworks] to redeem for cash out of any funds 
legally available therefor . . .. "142 After five years with no IPO, SVIP 
exercised its redemption option, only to be told by the Thoughtworks board 
that the company had essentially no cash with which to redeem the 
preferred. 143 The board would apply whatever spare cash dripped in each 
quarter to gradual redemption, but this repayment schedule held little 
value. 144 After all, a primary reason that the company had not gone public is 
that it was not profitable. 145 
Had SVIP been holding redeemable debt, it would have had less of a 
problem: it could have obtained a judgment of deficiency forcing 
136 See id. at 1888. 
137 See id. at 1889. 
138See, e.g., Bratton & Wachter, supra note 29, at 1890 (stating that common holders may 
have reasons to negotiate even when they are surviving). A personal anecdote aptly illustrates the 
point. Many years ago, during the dot-com boom, a distant acquaintance approached me with what 
seemed like an unusual offer: he would sell me a patent for a pittance, and then fund my efforts to 
develop the patent into a workable business. At first, I did not understand why he wanted to give me 
the patent instead of hiring me (perhaps with an incentivizing equity stake) to develop it. I soon 
learned that the patent was not exactly his: it was the sole remaining asset in a company he 
controlled, and it was buried under a six-figure liquidation preference. Selling me the asset would 
liberate it from the preference, at which point he could invest new, unencumbered equity in its 
development. Since I was on my way to law school, I declined his offer; I later learned that he found 
a partner for his transaction, although I do not know if anything ever became of their development 
project. 
139See Thoughtworks I, 7 A.3d 973, 982 (Del. Ch. 2010), aff'd 37 A.3d 205 (Del. 2011). 
140/d. at 987. 
141/d. at 976. 
142Id. at 978. 
143 Thoughtworks I, 7 A.3d at 979-80. 
144 !d. at 980. 
145 /d. at 979-80. 
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Thoughtworks to liquidate assets to repay the loan.146 Its preferred stock did 
not give it the right to force liquidation. 147 In denying SVIP's request for a 
court-ordered redemption, the Court of Chancery invoked the ancient rule 
that a corporation cannot distribute money to shareholders if doing so 
"diminishes the ability of the company to pay its debts"--even if the value of 
the firm's equity is positive. 148 As Vice Chancellor Laster explained: 
[A] corporation can nominally have surplus from which 
redemptions theoretically could be made and yet be unable to 
pay its debts as they come due. The common law prohibition 
on redemptions when a corporation is or would be rendered 
insolvent restricts a corporation's ability to redeem shares under 
those circumstances .... 149 
This restriction on redemption takes precedence over any clause in the 
certificate of designation that requires the company to redeem its preferred 
stock at a given price, or to pay "guaranteed dividends. "150 This is not to say 
the preferred lack all rights to mandatory distributions when the company 
has no cash on hand-as the Thoughtworks board recognized, the preferred 
had a valid claim on whatever drips of cash become available as the 
company continues its operations. 151 However, as the Delaware Supreme 
Court held in SVIP's appeal, determination of when funds become legally 
available is a matter reserved for the business judgment of the board.152 
Thoughtworks' charter contained an additional restriction on the 
preferred's redemption right: it could only draw on "legally available" funds 
that were "not ... designated by the Board of Directors as necessary to fund 
the working capital requirements of the Corporation .... "153 In other words, 
the company was entitled to keep a sufficient amount of cash on hand to pay 
146See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 9-60 I (2005). In response, of course, Thoughtworks likely 
would have declared bankruptcy. Still, SVIP would have had an unsubordinated claim on its assets 
and a concrete expectation of some near-term recovery. 
147 See Thoughtworks I, 7 A.3d at 992. 
148See id. at 987 (quoting In re Int'l Radiator Co., 92 A. 255, 256 (Del. Ch. 1914)). 
149/d. 
150 /d. at 986. 
151 See Thoughtworks I, 7 A.3d at 980. 
152SV Inv. Partners, LLC v. Thoughtworks, Inc. (Thoughtworks II), 37 A.3d 205,211 (Del. 
20 II) ("When a board decides on the amount of surplus available to make redemptions, its decision 
is entitled to deference absent a showing that the board: (I) acted in bad faith, (2) relied on 
unreliable methods and data, or (3) made determinations so far off the mark as to constitute actual or 
constructive fraud."). 
153 /d. at 207. 
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employee salaries and claims of trade creditors as they arose. 154 Because the 
charter contained this express restriction, the court did not have occasion to 
decide if a working capital exclusion was legally required. It seems likely, 
based on the court's logic, that the company would have been able to exclude 
a reasonable measure of working capital from the funds available to the 
preferred, regardless of the terms of the contract. If the preferred could draw 
on all the company's cash, it could jeopardize the company's solvency. 
Creditors left waiting for cash to drip in might, at some point, obtain a 
judgment giving them a right to seize or force liquidation ofthe company's 
assets. 155 Any redemption provision that did not allow the board to keep 
some cash in reserve to prevent such a circumstance would seem to be 
inconsistent with the "statutory or common law restrictions ... that the 
corporation be able to continue as a going concern and not be rendered 
ihsolvent by the distribution. 11156 
D. Contract Does Not Adequately Protect Preferred Investors 
In 2002, William Bratton summed up the plight of a preferred 
shareholder under Delaware law: 
Preferred stockholders face a uniquely hostile interpretive 
environment. ... When senior-junior securityholder [sic] 
interests conflict, the managers' interest usually lies with the 
juniors. As a result, the Delaware courts have for decades been 
ratifying senior-to-junior wealth transfers. 
[Thus,] a preferred stockholder who does not control the 
board or possess a majority of the voting shares needs a 
carefully drafted, triple-riveted set of charter terms. Having 
gotten that, it will still need the best lawyer in town should any 
problems arise. 157 
A decade has passed since this assessment, but it is mostly accurate today. 
Preferred stock remains highly vulnerable to wealth transfers to the common 
equity, and the charter provisions designed to discourage such opportunism 
154Id at 212. 
155See id. 
156See Thoughtworks I, 7 A.3d at 988. 
157Bratton, supra note I, at 938-39. 
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fail much more frequently than analogous provisions in corporate debt. 158 
Contract may be a theoretically elegant prophylactic, but in practice, it does 
not seem adequate to the task. 159 
In a 2004 article, Bratton changed his tone slightly, suggesting that 
maybe the preferred has only itself to blame.160 Noting that "[t]he end-run 
merger with a wholly-owned subsidiary has been there in the form file for 
almost seventy years, and still lawyers do not plug the loophole[,]" he 
observed that "parties in preferred stock deals just do not get it"-"it" being 
the folly of foregoing robust protection in favor of a "couple of extra basis 
points in yield. "161 Without question, there is some truth to this charge. 
During the credit bubble of the first decade of this century, investors and 
lenders were so yield-hungry that they bought hundreds ofbillions of dollars 
worth of so-called "covenant-lite" debt-i.e., debt issued with few, if any, 
financial covenants to protect the lender. 162 For instance, KKR was able to 
draw on $13B of covenant-lite bank financing and $9B in subordinated debt 
to finance a very heavily leveraged buyout of First Data.163 While the market 
for junk debt paused briefly after the financial crisis, it did not lay dormant 
for long: by 2011, issuance of covenant-lite debt had recovered to its 2006 
pace.164 If investors are eschewing covenants in debt contracts, it is doubtful 
that they would insist on less-enforceable provisions in preferred 
transactions. 
158See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 29, at 1874. 
159 See id at 1846 ("Complete contract treatment coupled with appraisal exclusivity is 
untenable in extreme cases."). 
1Waratton, supra note 30, at 862-63. 
161/d. 
162See Harvey R. Miller, Chapter 11 In Transition-From Boom to Bust and into the 
Future, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 375, 380 (2007) (noting that almost $48B in covenant-lite debt was 
issued in the frrst quarter of 2007 alone). 
163Vipal Monga, First Data's Banks Start Debt Sale, THE DEAL, Sept. 18, 2007. The 
company's debt was over I 0 times cash flow. See Dana Cimilluca, Ahead OfThe Tape, WALL ST. 
J ., July 9, 2007, at C I (citing a Fitch Ratings' characterization of this leverage as "aggressive even by 
today's freewheeling standards"). The transaction had originally been structured to include over 
$14B worth of covenant-lite bank debt with essentially no financial covenants at all, but by the 
summer of2007, some investors had begun to become wary of credit market volatility. See Monga, 
supra. Still, the loan included only a loose maintenance covenant described by one banker as 
"toothless," and permitted the interest to be repaid in the form of more debt for up to four years. See 
id 
164 Compare Gregory Zuckerman & Matt Wirtz, There's Plenty Of Money For Junk, WALL 
ST. J., May 1, 2012, at CJ (noting that $1 J.SB worth of covenant-lite debt was issued both in May, 
2011 and April, 2012), with Miller, supra note 162, at 380 (noting that, in calendar year 2006, 
$23.68 in covenant-lite debt was issued). It may take a long time before the debt markets reach 
2007 levels of insanity, but 2006 was plenty crazy: according to Harvey Miller, more covenant-lite 
debt issued that year than in the previous ten years combined. Miller, supra note 162, at 380. 
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Still, a broader canvas of the case law suggests a different, 
complimentary hypothesis: a preferred stock contract is simply very hard to 
write with the precision demanded of it. 165 Consider that one year after the 
Avatex decision, a well-established venture capital firm called Benchmark 
Capital Partners invested in the preferred stock of Juniper Financial 
according to terms that left it vulnerable to a white-out merger not unlike the 
one at issue in Avatex. 166 In rejecting Benchmark's motion to enjoin the 
white-out transaction, Vice Chancellor Noble implied that Benchmark had 
been unaware of Avatex167 and perhaps even of "a long line of Delaware 
cases" holding that covenants in a preferred stock certificate do not apply to 
mergers if "the protective provisions do not expressly afford protection 
against a merger." 168 How could this have happened? As the Vice 
Chancellor observed, "Benchmark and its representative ... had extensive 
experience in investing in preferred securities .... "169 It seems unlikely that 
ignorance of the law was at fault. 
It is more likely that Benchmark's blunder was caused by the 
complexity of Juniper's capital structure and the concomitant difficulty that 
Benchmark might have had in anticipating the transaction that was used to 
exploit it. Indeed, the capital structure was initially simple, and Benchmark's 
preferred stock was guarded by a thorough set of covenants that did 
expressly protect against mergers or consolidations. 170 However, the firm 
soon needed a new and larger round of financing, and the new investor, 
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC), understandably did not want 
to operate in the shadow of Benchmark's unilateral veto powers. 171 To 
facilitate the new investment, Benchmark gave CIBC the power to operate 
free of those covenants so long as CIBC did not use this so-called "covenant 
trump" to diminish or alter Benchmark's rights. 172 It was the covenant trump 
165 Cf Smith, supra note 13, at 848 ("If the Delaware courts employ the duty of good faith to 
most contracts because they are inherently incomplete, why do the Delaware courts demand 
complete contracts for preferred stockholders?"). 
166See generally Benchmark Capital Partners IV v. Vague, 2002 WL 1732423 (Del. Ch. 
July 15, 2002). 
167 See id. at *9 ("The corporate charter of Juniper was adopted after our Supreme Court's 
decision in A vat ex and the drafters of the Certificate are charged with knowledge of its holding 
.... "). 
168Id. at *7. 
169/d. at *11. 
170See Benchmark, 2002 WL 1732423, at *I. 
171 See id. at *2. Indeed, it would have been dangerous for CffiC to permit Benchmark-
which was now a minority investor-to exercise a firm-wide veto. Benchmark could have held the 
fum hostage by threatening to use veto at every opportunity unless it was given special concessions 
not to do so. See id. at *I. 
172See id. at *3. 
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provision that lacked express protection against a merger, 173 probably 
because Benchmark did not foresee that erne, a fellow preferred stock 
investor, would scheme with the common to implement a white-out merger 
designed to injure only Benchmark's shares. 174 In retrospect, of course, 
Benchmark should have considered that possibility, but it is not as if 
Benchmark fell into trap for the unwary. It fell into a trap for the less-than-
hypervigilant.175 
An even simpler, but still plausible, explanation for Benchmark's folly 
is that its attorneys made a mistake. It is unrealistic to expect preferred stock 
investors to be perfect-not when the most experienced and prestigious 
M&A lawyers consistently made mistakes in negotiating private equity 
transactions, 176 white-shoe investment bankers conducted due diligence 
shoddy enough to enable its client to sell itself to a fraudulent enterprise, 177 
and sophisticated financial traders can lose billions of dollars in a matter of 
weeks. 178 The problem for preferred shareholders is that they have almost no 
173See id. at *10. 174It is not worth reciting the complexities of that scheme here. It will suffice to note that its 
end result was that CffiC's preferred became senior to Benchmark's. See Benchmark, 2002 WL 
1732423, at *1. 
175See, e.g., infra notes 258-65 and accompanying text (discussing another example of 
preferred stock being stripped of its preferences by an action taken by another preferred series). 
176See Steven M. Davidoff, The Failure Of Private Equity, 82 S. CAL. L. REv. 481,513-15 
(2009) (cataloguing the many negotiating and drafting mistakes in private equity acquisitions during 
the 2006-2008 time frame). 
177See Loren Feldman, The $580 Million Black Hole, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2012), 
http://www .nytimes.com/20 12/07 /15/business/goldman-sachs-and-a-sale-gone-horribly-awry.html 
(describing how Dragon Systems, a firm advised by Goldman Sachs, was sold to a fraudulent 
enterprise in exchange for worthless stock). While it is clear that someone dropped the ball in the 
Dragon Systems sale, it might not have been Goldman Sachs: it convinced a jury that it was not 
culpable for the shareholders' loss, in part by introducing testimony from its bankers that they had 
raised concerns with Dragon management only to be brushed aside. See Steven M. Davidoff, 
Lessons For Entrepreneurs in Rubble of a Collapsed Deal, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK(Jan. 29,2013, 
7:44 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/0l/29/lessons-for-entrepreneurs-in-rubble-of-a-co 
llapsed-deal/. Culpability aside, though, it is inconceivable that the transaction would have been so 
completely botched had Goldman's representation been subpar in at least some respect. 178The multi-billion dollar losses suffered by J.P. Morgan in connection to the "London 
Whale" is but one example of clever trading gone awry. See Ben Protess et al, In JP Morgan Chase 
Trading Bet, Its Confidence Yields to Loss, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (May 11, 2012, 9:49PM), 
http:/ I deal book. nytimes.corn/20 12/05/ II /in-j pmorgan-chase-trading-bet-its-confidence-yie 
Ids-to-loss/ (describing the London Whale trade, and noting other's belief that the mistake was "self-
inflicted"). Still, the clearest example of trader fallibility may be Howie Hubler's infamous MBS 
trade, chronicled in Michael Lewis's The Big Short, that lost $9B by itself. See MICHAEL LEWIS, 
THE BIG SHORT INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE, 143-53 (201 0). This disaster was not the result 
of recklessness or greed, but of miscalculation. Hubler thought he was making a smart long/short 
trade, fmancing a short bet on the junior tranches of mortgage backed securities (which he correctly 
predicted would fail) by using interest payments generated by much larger long positions in the 
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margin for error; a single crack in the fortress wall may cause the entire 
protective edifice to collapse. 179 
Consider, for instance, the redemption obligation at issue in the 
Thoughtworks case. 180 There, the preferred stock issued in 1999 with a 
certificate provision giving the preferred the right to recoup its original 
equity investment if the company had not gone public after five years. 181 As 
the firm and the investor both anticipated going public within two years182-
recall that 1999 was near the height of the dot com mania183-both parties 
must have expected that, by 2004, a still-private Thoughtworks would likely 
be an unprofitable and perhaps almost dead company. Hence the redemption 
provision, which the preferred would use to salvage its initial investment. It 
would have made no sense for that obligation to have been constrained by 
the firm's liquidity; to the contrary, the preferred wanted an exit from what it 
feared would be an illiquid if not wholly insolvent firm. 
It probably came as some surprise to the deal lawyers for both sides 
when the Thoughtworks certificate was found to permit redemption only out 
of liquid capital, because the stock could be redeemed only out of "funds 
legally available." 184 In so ruling, the Court of Chancery merely interpreted 
the certificate's plain language; as it noted, the word funds refers to "cash, 
cash-equivalents, and other relatively liquid assets that could readily be used 
as a source of cash."185 It is unlikely that the contract drafters actually 
intended to limit recovery to "funds" so narrowly defined; after all, the 
purpose of the redemption provision was to permit SVIP an exit when the 
company's cash was running dry. 186 Somewhere along the line, attorneys 
AAA-rated senior tranches of those securities (which he thought were safe). See id. at 143-44. The 
senior tranche paid less interest than the junior position demanded, so Hubler's long positions had to 
be much larger in principal amount than his short transaction. See id. at 140. Apparently he didn't 
consider the possibility that the AAA tranches could also fail; when they did, his gains on shorting 
the junior tranches was dwarfed by the losses on his much larger long position. See id. at 175-76. 
179For another example of a contracting mistake by a sophisticated preferred stock investor, 
see In re Sunstates Corp. S'Holder Litig., 788 A.2d 530 (Del. Ch. 2001). There, the preferred 
certificate prevented the company from repurchasing common shares if a preferred dividend was 
outstanding, but the preferred had forgotten to prohibit such repurchases by subsidiaries. /d. at 532-
34. As a result, the company was able to circumvent the provision. The Court of Chancery, citing a 
fifty-year-old treatise, declined to enjoin the company's opportunism. /d. at 531-32 n.2. 
180See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
181See Thoughtworks I, 7 A.3d 973,978-79 (Del. Ch. 2010), affd37 A.3d205 (Del. 2011). 
182See Thoughtworks II, 37 A.3d 205, 207 (Del. 2011) ("[The parties] initially expected 
an ... [IPO to occur] within one to two years."). 
183 See Declan McCullagh, Nasdaq 5, 000: Ten Years After the Dot-com Peak, CNET (Mar. 
10,2010 4:00AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-10466637-7.htrnl. 
184Thoughtworks II, 37 A.3d at 207. 
185 Thoughtworks I, 7 A.3d at 984. 
186See id. at 978. 
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made a mistake, although it might not have been the attorneys involved in 
this particular deal. Professors Bratton and Wachter describe the "funds 
legally available" language as a drafting convention, which would point to a 
systemic error in deal lawyers' standard practices. 187 At some stage in the 
production process, undue attention was given to avoiding statutory 
prohibitions against impairment of a corporation's capital, reflected in SVIP's 
focus on legal availability. 188 The word "funds" might have become drafting 
convention out of mere happenstance-the product of a personal preference 
of lawyers for the word "funds" over the more sterile "capital legally 
available." Whatever the cause, SVIP chose the wrong word and lost the 
case. 189 
Sometimes the lawyers' mistakes are more obviously mistakes. In a 
pair of recent cases, holders of convertible preferred shares sought to block 
mergers on the grounds that the compensation granted to them-namely, as-
if-converted value-was insufficient.190 It is hard to criticize the dismissal of 
these claims, since the certificates of designation expressly stated that the 
preferred would receive merger consideration no more or less than the as-if-
converted value. 191 On the economics of the issue, the investors had the 
better claim. Convertible preferred is equivalent to ordinary preferred plus a 
conversion option, which is itself a type of call option. 192 The value of a call 
option, in turn, depends on expectations of how valuable the underlying 
asset might become before the option expires. 193 Why, then, would the 
preferred negotiate for a conversion option if the common could force its 
exercise (via merger) the minute it came into the money? A call option with 
187Bratton & Wachter, supra note 29, at 1860-63. 
188See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN tit. 8 § 160(a)(l) (2006) (stating that a company may not 
effect any purchase or redemption that would cause any impairment of the capital of the 
corporation). 
189 As noted above, SVIP would have lost anyway; the Vice Chancellor ultimately observed 
that preferred shareholders cannot force the liquidation of assets regardless of the certificate 
language. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text. But the drafting error let the court hold 
against SVIP on narrow grounds, which would have made a difference had the court adopted a 
default legal rule somewhat more favorable to the preferred. 
190See LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd., v. James, 990 A.2d 435, 438 (Del. Ch. 2010); In re 
Metromedia Int'l Grp., Inc., 971 A.2d 893, 902 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
191See LC Capital, 990 A.2d at 438; In re Metromedia, 971 A.2d at 901. 
192 A call option gives its holder a right to buy a certain number of shares at a certain price. 
See Option Types: Calls & Puts, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/investing/options-guide/opti 
on-types-puts-calls.aspx (last visited Feb. 9, 2014). In a conversion option, investors have arightto 
convert their preferred shares into a certain number of common shares-which is to say that they 
can buy those shares for a price equal to the value of the preferred stock. See Bratton & Wachter, 
supra note 29, at 1878. 
193See Tobias Hammar, Valuation of Options, NASDAQ OMX, http://nordic.nasdaqom 
xtrader.com/trading/optionsfutures/Education/V aluation _of_ Options (last visited Feb. 9, 20 14). 
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little upside is a curious investment indeed, 194 but that was what the contract 
created. One need not think that these cases were wrongly decided to be 
concerned that the lawyers drafting preferred stock agreements simply 
cannot bear the heavy responsibility that the courts are placing on them. As 
always, transaction costs lurk in the background. 195 There are limits to how 
much investors will pay lawyers in seven- or low-eight-digit transactions and 
how much attorney diligence that money will buy. 196 
Even the most sophisticated parties obtain legal advice riddled with 
mistakes. For instance, Professor Steven Davidoff has catalogued, 
classified, and dissected the numerous mistakes made by highly experienced, 
top-rate attorneys in private equity contracts during the bubble of2006--08.197 
As he explains, the problem includes not only human error, but structural 
features of legal markets that encourage lawyers to rely on sub-optimal 
contractual protections for their clients. 198 Indeed, many of the cases 
described above represent real-world examples where experienced and 
highly reputable attorneys made mistakes that left their clients open to 
opportunism. 199 The same will continue to be true in the preferred stock 
context, except to a greater degree. Stock issuance is a more routine, lower-
margin transaction, for which the highest-priced, most diligent legal services 
are uneconomical. The law should expect mistakes; the question is what to 
do in response. 
E. Fiduciary Duties: From Protection To Oppression 
If the preferred has little financial protection, and cannot reliably 
protect itself through contract, then one last non-nuclear option remains: the 
board's fiduciary duties, which purportedly protect all shareholders, 
including the preferred, in some capacity.200 These can only offer limited 
194Admittedly, there is a strong efficiency rationale for the existence of some mandatory 
conversion price. Acquirers might be reluctant to engage in serious negotiations so long as the 
preferred can hold up any deal to extract a better price. Mandatory conversion thus simplifies 
merger negotiations and deliberations. Still, mandatory conversion need not occur at the same price 
as optional conversion. The preferred should have demanded at least some premium over as-if-
converted value in the event of a merger, to compensate them for losing the option value of their 
preferred shares. 
195See, e.g., Thoughtworks I, 7 A.3d 973, 978 (Del. Ch. 2010), a.ff'd 37 A.3d 205 (Del. 
2011) (noting that the original value of the preferred investment was $26.6M). 
196See id 
191See Davidoff, supra note 176, at 513-15. 
198/d. 
199See supra Part II.D. 
200See supra Part II.E. 
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protection, because the board's loyalties will run to the common when the 
interests of the common and the preferred collide-as they inevitably will on 
occasion, as described above in Part II.C.201 Still, fiduciary duties could be 
interpreted to encourage the board to act in a peacekeeping role, in which it 
would endeavor to protect each shareholder class from each other, and avoid 
or at least minimize conflicts where possible.202 
Not so long ago, Delaware law contained an important peacekeeping 
component. The famous Jedwab formulation required the board to exercise 
its business judgment for the non-exclusive benefit when the preferred's 
claimed right "is not to a preference as against the common stock but rather a 
right shared equally with the common .... "203 Since the board cannot serve 
two warring masters, the Jedwab principle was accompanied by the Katz 
corollary that "it will be the duty of the board ... to prefer the interests of 
common stock-as the good faith judgment of the board sees them to be-to 
the interests created by the special rights, preferences, etc., of preferred 
stock, where there is a conflict. "204 This rhetorical formulation was still 
reconciliatory; the mention of conflict is set apart by a comma at the end, as 
if it was an exogenous condition that would necessitate the board to choose 
sides out of an inability to please all parties at once. This would not be the 
most favorable rule for preferred shareholders, but it would not be a disaster. 
Recent Delaware law, however, has followed a different path. It has 
embraced a model of fiduciary duties that casts the board as a bully, picking 
fights with the preferred on behalf of the common. The bully model featured 
prominently in the famous 1997 case of Equity-Linked Investors v. Adams, a 
case involving what can best be described as an ambush of the preferred 
shareholders of the struggling biotechnology company Genta Incorporated. 205 
Genta's total equity was valued at less than the liquidation value of the 
preferred, and was consistently losing money.206 To finance its continued 
operation, it obtained convertible debt financing from an asset management 
fund (Aries), conditional on giving Aries the right to appoint the majority of 
201See supra Part II.C. 
202This peacekeeping role appears to be what Bratton and Wachter advocate in their recent 
article. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 29, at 1898-1900 (arguing for a good faith standard of 
review of preferred-initiated mergers, with the burden of proof on the board, so as to put "procedural 
pressure on the venture capitalist to examine alternatives" to the exploitative merger). 
203 Jd. at 1848. 
204See Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1042 (Del. Ch. 1997) 
(restating the holding of Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986). 
205The irony here is that Equity-Linked Investors succinctly formulated the peacekeeping 
principle that it eviscerated. See id. at I 041. 
206See id. at 1044, 1057. 
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the board.207 Tn effect, the transaction vacuumed up most of the preferred's 
value and distributed it to Aries and the Genta common in the form of option 
value.208 If the company's extended lease on life produced a valuable drug, 
then the common equity could vastly increase in value.209 If not, the losses 
would be borne by the preferred, who were now subordinated to debt and 
likely to receive nothing in bankruptcy.210 It was a classic option value of 
equity play,211 and the preferred sued to enjoin it. 212 
The Chancellor resolved Equity-Linked Investors by cheering on the 
ambush. 213 The preferred contended that the Aries transaction was a Rev/on 
change-of-control transaction, and asked the court to order an auction to 
obtain the best value reasonably available.214 The preferred's plan was to win 
the auction, obtain control, and likely sell or liquidate the company.215 The 
money spent to buy out the common would be lost, but at least the preferred 
would salvage some equity.216 It was not to be. The court held that even if 
Genta was required to conduct an auction, it was permitted to exclude the 
preferred from bidding. 217 The preferred thus could not avoid subordination 
under the convertible debt. To his credit, the Chancellor recognized the 
implications of his opinion. He saw the ambush, and expressly approved: 
A bidding contest between the [preferred] and a new investor 
interested in developing Genta's intellectual property would be 
a poor way to attempt to maximize either the present value or 
some future value of the common stock in these particular 
circumstances, I assume, as the facts allow, that the Series A 
liquidation premium is greater than the liquidation value of the 
firm-but that the preferred stock has no legal right to force a 
liquidation. In that event, the preferred would have a bidding 
207 See id. at 1052. 
208See Equity-Linked Investors, 705 A.2d at 1048-52. 
209 See id. at 1 041. 
210See id. at 1050. Aries, of course, also had capital at risk. !d. at 1051. But with control 
of the board, it could pull the plug on the company's operations after all the preferred equity had 
been exhausted but before the debt was substantially impaired. !d. at I 048. 
211 See supra notes 42-62 and accompanying text. 
212See Equity-Linked Investors, 705 A.2d at 1042. 
213See id at 1059. 
214The rationale for the Rev/on claim was that Aries had taken control of the firm. See id. at 
1055. Its debt was convertible into enough common equity to give it a majority stake in the firm, 
and it exercised board control even before conversion. !d. at I 052. 
215
Jd. at 1057. 
216See Equity-Linked Investors, 705 A.2d at I 057. 
217Jd. 
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advantage and would use it to deprive the common of their 
power to exploit the preferred that the common currently 
possesses. Assume, for example, that .... [a third party] bid 
would permit the common stock some further opportunity to 
see a payoff in the company labs and in the marketplace. Now 
assume that a bidding contest occurs in which the preferred 
takes part. What will probably happen? The preferred's aim 
might be simply to liquidate the company and take all of the net 
proceeds and apply it to its preference. This will prevent its 
exploitation by the common and cut its losses .... 
To generalize, the existence of a "below water" liquidation 
preference would allow the preferred to ... defeat an attempt to 
exploit the company's properties (and not incidentally, an 
attempt to exploit the preferred in its current situation) for the 
benefit of the common stock. What the board did, in effect, 
was to try on behalf of the common to exploit the preferred-
by imposing risks on them without proportionate opportunity 
for rewards. That the preferred is open to this risk legally, is a 
function of the terms of its security. I think it is perfectly 
permissible for the board to choose this course in these 
circumstances. 218 
Thus, the Jedwab principle that the board should favor the common over the 
preferred in the face of a conflict had morphed into permission for the board 
to instigate a conflict, and favor the common.219 In fact, this is such a 
combative stance that seems to abandon the concept of fiduciary duties 
toward the preferred altogether. Note the repeated use of the word 
"exploit. "220 Whatever it is that a fiduciary is required to do, surely it cannot 
gratuitously "impose risks" on the principal without any proportionate 
opportunity for rewards. Nor can this holding be justified on the grounds of 
economic efficiency. In essence, it permitted the common to extend the life 
of a money-losing operation by buying a lottery card paying out cents on the 
dollar. The deal was profitable for the common only because the preferred 
absorbed the deadweight loss. On the whole, the arrangement was ex ante 
value-destroying. 
218/d. 
219See id. 
220 See supra text accompanying note 218. 
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Contrast the board's bullying tactics with a more peaceful option. 
Following Rothschild International, Corp. v. Liggett Group, Inc., the board 
could have sold the firm in a deal that cashed the preferred out for less than 
its preference and allocated positive consideration to the common. 221 This 
would hardly be the best imaginable outcome for the preferred, but it would 
have no valid complaint. There was, in fact, some degree of genuine conflict 
between the common and the preferred, because the going-concern and 
liquidation values of the firm were both less than the liquidation 
preference.222 The common's value was entirely option-based and thus the 
common wanted the company to extend its life indefinitely;223 the preferred 
claimed whatever intrinsic value remained in the assets and wanted the 
company to shut down.224 That conflict would have been minimized by a 
sale in which both sides obtained some consideration. This type of solution 
is further discussed in Part III. 225 
As written, Equity-Linked purported only to approve of the common's 
bullying tactics in "these circumstances"-that is, to a company in the zone 
of insolvency. 226 The holding, though, cannot be easily cabined to the 
context of financial distress. The common's desire to exploit the preferred 
does not uniquely arise when its equity value is negative. 227 As described 
above, common equity usually has the incentive to try to exploit any fixed 
claims with higher seniority, because its payoff function resembles a call 
option, with fixed downside and unlimited upside.228 This incentive happens 
be to be maximized when the common lacks equity, since there the option is 
deep out of the money and volatility is the only source of value. 229 But it is 
merely a matter of degree.230 In most circumstances, the common will have 
221 474 A.2d. 133, 135 (Del. 1984). 
222See Equity-Linked Investors, 705 A.2d at 1057. 
223Id at 1041. 
224See id. 
225 See infra Part III. 
226 Equity-Linked Investors, 705 A.2d at I 057. In fact, the company received its additional 
equity financing less than a week before it would have run out of cash and been forced into 
bankruptcy. Id at 1051. 
227 See id at I 042. 
228 See supra Part !I.A. This incentive shrinks with increasing intrinsic value of equity. See supra 
Part II.A. For a company like Apple, with $1 OOB on its balance sheet, this incentive would be infinitesimal 
Apple Inc., Notice of Exempt Solicitation (Form PX14A6G) (Feb. 7, 2013), available at 
http:/ /files.shareholder.com/downloads/ AAPI12906373658xOxS I 011438-13-69/320 193/filing.pdf. In such 
circumstances, preferred stock would not fear excessive risk-taking-hence the activism of shareholders 
seeking to convince Apple to issue preferred. See id. 
229See, e.g., Equity-Linked Investors, 705 A.2d at 1057. 
230See, e.g., id 
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some incentive act as a bully, simply because the nature of preferred means 
that it can.231 
Subsequent case law has, in fact, approved of bullying tactics in a 
wider variety of situations. Indeed, the 2010 case of LC Capital Master 
Fund, Ltd. v. James suggested that the common would even be permitted to 
extract value from the preferred that it had expressly granted by contract. 232 
The question posed there-albeit only in dicta-was whether the common 
could seek a merger that cashed out the preferred for the consideration 
established in the certificate of designation, even if the certificate also 
conferred a right to a fully guaranteed dividend ofhigher-net present value.233 
Following Equity-Linked, then-Vice Chancellor Strine reasoned that the 
preferred were entitled to the protections they negotiated by contract, and 
nothing more.234 But this begs the question of the parties' intent. Did the 
preferred mean to bargain for a guaranteed dividend that wasn't actually 
guaranteed because it could be evaded with a merger? Or did they intend for 
the merger formula to be applied in good faith transactions, not ones created 
to buy out the dividend at a discount? One would expect a fiduciary for the 
preferred to recognize the implied terms of the bargain, and to avoid 
exploiting an inconsistency or ambiguity in the contract. If, as the then-Vice 
Chancellor suggested, the board would be within its rights to concoct a 
transaction simply to deprive the preferred of a guaranteed dividend 
stream,235 is there anything left of a fiduciary duty to the preferred? 
The bullying discussed in LC CapitaP36 could be proscribed without 
resort to an expansive concept of preferred shareholder rights. Courts would 
merely need to examine the nature of the transaction in question, and could 
do so without looking at its "economic quality. "237 Sales to strategic buyers 
would probably not be motivated by a desire to strip preferred dividend 
rights, as strategic buyers rarely acquire companies for such extractive 
purposes. 238 They usually look for operational synergies or other business-
231 Cf. id. ("That the preferred is open to this risk legally, is a function of the terms of its 
security."); supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
232LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd., v. James, 990 A.2d 435,438-39 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
233ld. at 450-51 n.56 (discussing a hypothetical, not squarely presented in the case, what the 
then-Vice Chancellor considered "a much harder case" where of guaranteed). 
234/d at 438-39. 
235 Id at 450-51. 
236See LC Capital, 990 A.2d at 450-51 (holding that the common did not act "wrongly in 
viewing itself as under no obligation to satisfy" the desires of the preferred above what they are 
guaranteed by the Certificate). 
237 Cf. Elliot Assocs. v. Avatex Corp., 715 A.2d 843, 849 (Del. 1998) (suggesting that courts 
should evaluate the legality of merger transactions without evaluating their "economic quality"). 
238See DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP, Mergers & Acquisitions Operational Synergies: 
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related considerations, and often attempt to integrate the acquired assets (at 
least to a limited degree) with their other operations.239 In such cases, the 
courts could limit the preferred to the contractual merger consideration. By 
contrast, LC Capital involved a sale to a private equity buyer40-exactly the 
sort of transaction that the board would choose if it was attempting to exploit 
the preferred. Financial buyers can afford to pay to the common 
shareholders a premium (even if the common equity is fully valued by the 
market) and still profit if the merger strips the preferred's dividends. In these 
situations, courts should scrutinize more closely, with an eye to perhaps 
respecting the guaranteed dividend rights. 
Nevertheless, the then-Vice Chancellor opted for a bright-line rule, 
albeit in a discussion of how the case would have been resolved under 
different facts. 241 It is unfair to criticize him for that choice; the transaction-
type approach, whatever its merits, would be a departure from current 
trends.242 It is sufficient to note that if LC Capital represents the logical 
conclusion of the preferred stock jurisprudence, then fiduciary duties to the 
preferred have been emptied of all content. The rule of Jedwab, that "the 
board must act as a gap-filling agency and do its best to fairly reconcile the 
competing interests of the common and preferred" when "no objective 
contractual basis exists for treatment of the preferred,"243 is eviscerated. How 
can the court distinguish a failure of the parties to address a particular issue 
from the choice of one party not to seek any protection on that issue? When 
dividends are guaranteed but merger consideration is to be governed by a 
formula, the contract is ambiguous244-perhaps intentionally so. Or perhaps 
the problem was that the parties did not consider the possibility of the as-if-
converted formula yielding a result less than the present value of the 
dividends.245 The then-Vice Chancellor implicitly blamed the preferred as a 
Perspectives on the Winning Approach 1 (2013), available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/D 
com-UnitedStates!Loca1%20Assets/Documents/us _auto_ MAOperationalSynergiesPOV _Part%20 1 
_110713.pdf. 
239See id. 
240LC Capital, 990 A.2d at 442. 
241Id. at 450-51 n.56. To be clear, the preferred dividends in LC Capital were not 
guaranteed. See id. at 449. On the facts of the case, the preferred's argument was a bit of a Hail 
Mary, in light of the long-standing reluctance of the Delaware courts to criticize a board (let alone 
fmd it in breach of duty) for following the certificate of designation to the letter. See id. at 450-51 
n.56. 
242See id. at 450-51 n.56 ("Our law has not, to date, embraced the notion that Chancery 
should create economic value for preferred stockholders that they failed to secure at the negotiating 
table."). 
243See id. at 449 (citing Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, 509 A.2d 584, 593 (Del. Ch. 
1986)). 
244 See LC Capital, 990 A.2d at 451. 
245 As illustrated later, this situation is only likely to arise if there is a steep drop in the stock 
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matter of law for the contractual ambiguity/46 which seems only to confirm 
Bratton's diagnosis that the preferred face a uniquely hostile interpretive 
environment. 247 
The consequence of this doctrinal development is stark: preferred 
stock begins to lose all attractiveness as an investment vehicle. Lacking 
secure robust contractual provisions and any expectations of fair dealing or 
good faith by the board, preferred stock seems to have become nothing more 
than inferior form of debt. It is said that a corporate bond is not secured by 
any particular corporate asset, but rather by the entire asset base of the 
firm. 248 Preferred stock does not enjoy even that level of security.249 It has 
become super-unsecured. 
F. Conversion Options To The Rescue? 
It has been argued above that preferred stock has no right to recoup its 
principal or enforce promises to pay even "guaranteed dividends;" it is a 
likely target for ex post opportunism because of its high yield; it cannot 
easily contractually protect itself from such opportunism, and indeed, 
exploitation has become well within the scope of the board's fiduciary 
duties.250 Preferred stock seems to be a failure as a debt instrument.251 Can it 
be more successful if it is more like equity, or more specifically, convertible 
into equity? 
At a bare minimum, convertible preferred must expressly negotiate for 
contractual provisions that protect it from the abuses described above.252 
First, it must preserve the option value of the option that it purchases. Ifthe 
common insists, as will sometimes be reasonable, that the preferred can be 
cashed out in a merger, the preferred should not be satisfied with as-if-
converted consideration. Rather, it should demand an option-conversion 
premium on top of that. Second, the preferred must insist on obtaining the 
higher of the contractually specified merger consideration and the risk-
market and interest rates. 
246LC Capital, 990 A.2d at 450 n.56 ("Indeed, the only thing rendering the future dividend 
stream in the hard case a non-speculative future source of income would be the judicial holding that 
preferred stockholders who did not bargain for the right to block a merger that would result in the 
end of the corporation and therefore their future dividend stream, have to be compensated for the 
very stream that they did not procure a contractual right to force to continue."). 
247 See Bratton, supra note I, at 894. 
248See About Corporate Bonds, SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. Assoc., http://www.investin 
ginbonds.corn!leamrnore.asp?catid= I O&subcatid=47 &id= 181 (last visited Feb. 9, 2014). 
249See, e.g., LC Capital, 990 A.2d at 438. 
250See supra Part II.A-E. 
251See supra Part II.A-E. 
252See supra Part II.A-E. 
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adjusted present value of its dividends. Finally, if the courts are not going to 
permit it to obtain any compensation above what it specifically contracts for, 
it should insist on a provision that requires the board to reciprocate, and 
follow exactly the letter of the contract. Otherwise, it might be subject to the 
Korenvaes gambit, in which the board substituted a new formula for 
determining the new conversion price after a dividend distribution as an 
"alternate method" to the formula specifically set forth in the certificate.253 
Surprisingly, the company convinced Chancellor Allen to approve it;254 
unsurprisingly, the new formula was unfavorable to the preferred.255 
The preferred must also take care to protect against the Mary's Gone 
Crackers exploitation scheme, in which conversion right is used against the 
preferred to strip it of its liquidation preference.256 In that case, the plaintiff, 
Greenmont, was a venture capital fund holding series B convertible preferred 
stock in MGC, Inc.257 The certificate provided for an automatic conversion 
upon the majority vote of all preferred shareholders.258 Since the Series B 
was outnumbered by the Series A, the Series A controlled the outcome of the 
conversion vote. 259 Greenmont, however, had negotiated for a separate series 
vote on " [a ]ny agreement or action that alters or changes the voting or other 
253The certificate provided that the Adjusted Conversion Price (ACP) would be equal to the 
old conversion price (CP) times the difference between the market price of the common stock before 
the dividend (MP) and the fair market value (FMV) of the dividend, divided by the MP. HB 
Korenvaes Invs. v. Marriott Corp., 1993 WL257422, at *771 (Del. Ch. 1993), reprinted in 19 DEL. 
J.CORP.L. 748,771 (1993). Expressingitasaformula,ACP=CP*(MP-FMV)IMP. Jd Sincethe 
transaction was a spinoff, the distributed assets were shares in a new publicly traded company, the 
market value of which was readily ascertainable. !d. at *755. The board, however, decided on a 
different formula. !d. at *762. It divided the "intrinsic value" of the spun-off frrm by the sum of the 
intrinsic values of the spun-off firm and the post-spinoff value of the original ftrm, and multiplied 
that amount by the pre-spinoff value of the original frrm. !d. at *776. In other words, its formula 
was ACP = CP*(MP- (lntnew)/(Int..w + Int..;8.ps))/MP, where Int.- was the board-determined 
"intrinsic value" of the spun-off ftrm and Intons-ps the "intrinsic value" of the original frrm, post-
spinoff. !d. These formulas bear little resemblance. 
254The Chancellor gave two primary justifications for upholding this sleight of hand. Id at 
*778. First, he noted that the under the contractual formula, the fair market value of the spun-off 
firm could exceed that of the original ftrm. !d. This is not, as the Chancellor and the company 
argued, unreasonable. !d. Mergers and spin-offs frequently unlock value. Second, the certificate 
specified the fair market value of the spun-off assets would be "determined by the Board of 
Directors, whose determination shall be conclusive .... " Jd at *771. While this cannot possibly 
permit the board to invent any formula it wants, it would be better if preferred shareholders avoid 
this language in the future. 
255 !d. at *752. 
256 See generally Greenmont Capital Partners I, LP v. Mary's Gone Crackers, Inc., 2012 WL 
4479999 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
257 !d. at *I. 
2SS!d. 
259 !d. at *2. 
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powers, preferences, or other special rights" of the Series B.260 Greenmont 
likely believed that it was protected, but it apparently forgot that it was a 
preferred stockholder in Delaware, for whom certificate protections rarely 
function as intended. Indeed, the court interpreted the class vote provision 
not to apply to the automatic conversion right because: 
[A]utomatic conversion is one of the "special rights, privileges 
or restrictions" created by the Charter. . . . Because the 
Automatic Conversion provision exists on equal footing with 
the Voting Provision, an action taken under the Automatic 
Conversion provision cannot be seen to "alter or change" any of 
the Series B Preferred's "voting or other powers, preferences, or 
other special rights, privileges or restrictions. "261 
Somehow, an action taken specifically to nullify Greenmont's liquidation 
preference did not count as a change of its preference.262 Once again, the 
court failed to consider whether the contracting parties could possibly have 
intended this outcome. Why would Greenmont have bargained for a right 
for a class vote, if that right could simply be extinguished at the will of the 
Series A-which held inferior rights to the Series B and would gain power 
in a conversion? The special twist in this case was the court's interpretation 
of the conversion provision as a "right" ofthe Series B, even as that "right" 
was being forced upon the Series B and used to deprive it of its liquidation 
preference. 263 
Even assuming that the preferred manages to negotiate contractual 
protections that function as intended, conversion options are limited in what 
they can accomplish. First, options are very difficult, if not impossible, to 
value over very long time horizons.264 Since the duration of a preferred stock 
investment can be indefinite, practicability would require the conversion 
option to expire after some reasonably short period of time.265 After the 
option expired, the preferred would be unprotected.266 To be sure, the 
certificate could require that the parties agree to rollover the conversion 
260Greenmont Capital Partners, 2012 WL 4479999, at *2. 
26'Jd. at *5. 
262/d 
263/d at *4. 
264See Complete Guide To Corporate Finance, INVESTOPEDIA, ch. 5, http://www.inves 
topedia.cornlwalkthrough/corporate-finance/5/risk-management/option-valuation.aspx (last visited 
Feb. 9, 2014). 
265See id 
266See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 29, at 1834. 
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option when it expires at a new price, but this would create pricing 
discontinuities that could be taken advantage of by the common.267 
Second, conversion options merely give the preferred the ability to 
participate in the upside potential created by the common's excessive risk 
taking. 268 It does not change the fact that, if the equity cushion is small, the 
preferred will end up bearing most of the costs of the risky behavior.269 It is 
possible for the preferred to ask for a sufficient number of options to 
compensate, or perhaps a number of options that varies with the equity 
cushion, but it is unlikely that the common would readily agree to such an 
arrangement-which in any event would be complex and hard to administer. 
G. The Importance Of Control 
If all else fails, the preferred can try to reduce its exposure to 
opportunism by bargaining for control of the company-i.e., the ability to 
appoint or elect a majority of the board.270 It is easy to see how this could be 
a panacea: a preferred-elected board would be unlikely to adopt any 
opportunistic strategies that favor the common over the preferred;271 
moreover, if anything were to go terribly wrong, the board could sell all of 
the company's assets and permit the liquidation preference to be cashed in. 272 
Under stewardship from the preferred, the company would be managed 
conservatively, with a sufficient cash reserve to keep the preference full. 273 
However, the preferred rarely succeed in obtaining control rights, 
except in the special case of venture capital.274 As many scholars have 
267For instance, suppose each option term is seven years, and the first conversion option 
implies a strike price of twenty dollars per share. After six years, the original option has only one 
year left, after which the new option would take effect. If the new option price is expected to be 
substantially lower than twenty dollars per share, if for no other reason than the stock's volatility has 
changed and thus preserving the same option value requires a different strike price, then the common 
will have an incentive to force exercise before the first option expires, when its value is low. 
268See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 29, at 1847. 
269See id. at 1879. 
270See id. at 1874-75. 
271See Fried & Ganor, supra note 8, at 986. 
272 See, e.g., Orban v. Field, 1997 WL 153831, at *8-*9 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 1997), reprinted 
in 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 335,350,352 (1998) (fmding the board did not breach its fiduciary duty to 
common shareholders when the board allowed the preferred to conduct transactions that resulted in 
the common's ownership interest to dilute below 10 percent). 
273See Fried & Ganor, supra note 8, at 989-90. 
274See Stephen N. Kaplan & Per Stromberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real 
World: An Empirical Study of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 281,287 (2003). 
Even venture capitalists usually cannot obtain full control. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 29, at 
1874-75. The most common arrangement is for control to be shared between VC and entrepreneur: 
each side gets to appoint equal numbers of directors to the board, and the directors agree upon a 
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observed, preferred control creates an economic inefficiency that would tend 
to disappear in a robust capital market.275 In particular, investors will not be 
willing to hold common equity underneath a preference without assurances 
that the board will take enough risks to offer them upside potential. 276 
Venture capital is a special case, because the venture capital business model 
is highly risk-seeking by nature.277 The upside potential that VCs obtain with 
a conversion option on their preferred stock is typically offar greater interest 
to them than the preservation of their initial capital investment. 278 Of course, 
VCs seek to protect their capital when the prospects of a portfolio firm 
sours,279 but ab initio, the common equity need not fear excessive risk 
aversion. In any event, entrepreneurs desperate for funding might not have 
choice in the matter, ifVCs insist on control as a condition for financing.280 
Outside the VC context, it is hard to see why the common equity would 
ever agree to yield control. As vulnerable as the preferred may be to 
opportunism, matters are appreciably worse for an equity classes junior to a 
controlling tranche.281 Indeed, to the common, vulnerability to opportunism 
would be a luxury compared to the constant oppression of its financial interests 
to which it would be subject.282 The common's economic position would 
resemble that of the second player in a one-stage dictator game: it gets the 
residual interest, but only according to a division of assets chosen at the 
discretion of the senior tranches. The common can expect, for instance, the 
preferred to siphon out as much cash as possible, leaving only enough 
third-party director to fill out the board and in essence arbitrate disputes. See Kaplan & Stromberg, 
supra, at 288-90 (finding control to be shared control61 percent of the time). 
215See, e.g., Bratton & Wachter, supra note 29, at 1839-41 (collecting authorities and 
arguing that it is more efficient to protect the common residual interest with board control and 
fiduciary duties than by contract). 
276See Fried & Ganor, supra note 8, at 977. 
271See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 29, at 1885 ("Venture capital investment is a high-
risk, high-return proposition for all participants."). 
218See id at 1878-79. 
219See id at 1878. 
280See generally Bratton, supra note I. 
281Note that in the cases in which the common was able to exploit the preferred, the 
preferred was not completely wiped out-usually, it ended up taking a steep haircut. See supra Part 
ll.E. By contrast, when preferred adds control to its seniority, it can easily leave the common with 
nothing. For instance, the company might be sold at a price below the liquidation preference, which 
lets the preferred recoup most or all of its investment and avoid further downside risk. See, e.g., In 
re Trados S'holder Litig. (Trados II), 73 A.3d 17,76 (Del. Ch. 2013) (upholding the decision of a 
preferred-controlled board to sell the company for net proceeds less than the liquidation preference 
as entirely fair, even though the board "failed to consider the common stockholders, and sought to 
exit [the investment] without recognizing the conflicts of interest presented by the Merger .... "). 
The fact pattern of the Trados cases is discussed extensively infra Part ill. 
282Jesse Fried and Mira Ganor have noted that "common shareholders may be vulnerable to 
preferred shareholder opportunism when preferred shareholders control the board." Fried & Ganor, 
supra note 8, at 972. 
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reinvestment funds to keep the asset base from depreciating below the value of 
the liquidation preference of the company.283 In theory, the common would 
retain unlimited upside, but the preferred would rarely permit the company to 
take sufficient risks for upside to materialize.284 Only if the common insisted 
on giving the preferred a conversion option would its interests be taken into 
consideration by the board. 285 The irony, or perhaps absurdity, is that the 
common would benefit only by giving something of value away for free. 286 
Thus, preferred shareholders are able to obtain control in situations 
where they are sufficiently powerful that they probably had little to fear from 
exploitation by the common. 287 The general power of the preferred to 
alleviate its vulnerability through controF88 is likely to be limited absent a 
more creative and grander bargain between common and preferred. This 
topic is explored in the next Section.289 
III. RESUSCITATION: THE GRAND BARGAIN OF 
DIVIDED BOARD CONTROL 
Not all is lost for preferred stock. Its exclusion from fiduciary duties 
is, without more, but a minor tragedy; as it happens, duties aren't particularly 
valuable to investors in the first place.290 The bigger problem is that the 
preferred typically relies on contract rights to protect its interests, rather than 
what might be called decisional calculus representation. 291 This latter term is 
shorthand for the intuition that investors can expect better treatment by the 
corporation's management if it would be costly for management to make 
decisions that treat them adversely.292 In most companies, both debt and 
common have such representation, whereas preferred usually lacks anything 
stronger than the unreliable contract-lite covenants described above.293 
283See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 29, at 1825. 
284See Fried & Ganor, supra note 8, at 993. 
285 See id at 970. 
286See id 
287 See id. at 972. 
288See infra notes 296-97 and accompanying text. 
289 See infra Part III. 
290See Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits ofShareholder Control, U.C.L.A. SCH. L. L. & 
ECON. RES. PAPER SERIES 06-19, 11 (arguingthatWO firms tend to opt for charter provisions that 
minimize the fiduciary duties owed to the investors); Larry E. Ribstein, The Uncorporation's 
Domain, 55 VILL. L. REV. 125, 137 (2010) (observing that LLCs, which have greater latitude to 
privately order fiduciary duties, typically opt for lower standards than higher ones). 
291See Fried & Ganor, supra note 8, at 975-76. 
292See Stout, supra note 290, at 12. 
293 See supra Part I. 
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Saving preferred stock is simply a matter of obtaining representation 
of its interests alongside those of common and debt in the day-to-day 
decision-making of the company-specifically the right to appoint the 
majority of directors to the board. The common, of course, must agree to 
such an arrangement. 294 Such agreement can be secured with a grand bargain 
of sorts between the preferred and the common, which I call Divided Board 
Control ("DBC"): the preferred gets to appoint the majority of board and by 
extension the executives, but the common gets to set their compensation and 
continues to be the recipients of fiduciary duties. The preferred obtains its 
goal, which is protection against opportunistic exploitation, while the 
common uses its compensation power to induce that level of risk -taking that 
it desires. 295 
A. The Corporate Decisional Calculus 
Corporate decision-makers (e.g., the officers and/or the board) can be 
induced to take heed of investors' interests primarily by three familiar 
mechanisms: the investors' power to replace the decision-makers, the 
alignment of interests between investors and the decision-makers, and the 
firm's capital market reputation. In standard governance arrangements, these 
inducement mechanisms are over-allocated to the common, mildly under-
allocated to debt, and allocated hardly at all to the preferred.296 Alignment of 
interests almost always redounds to the common's benefit, as directors and 
managers frequently are paid in part with common equity interests and 
essentially never with preferred.297 Thus, common stockholders can 
confidently anticipate that the board will at least attempt to increase the share 
price of the common. In most corporations, the common equity also elects 
the board, and, as noted above, they enjoy the protections of fiduciary duties 
294 See id. at 986-89. 
295 See supra Part II. 
296See Fried & Ganor, supra note 8, at 975-76. 
297 See infra note 314 and accompanying text. To be sure, executive compensation 
frequently includes some deferred-cash components, such as severance agreements, defmed benefit 
pensions or retirement plans, change-in-control bonuses, and so forth. See Fried & Ganor, supra 
note 8, at 989. Since these obligations are rarely bankruptcy-remote to the corporation, they often 
situate executives as creditors of their employers, and every so often, executives will act in 
accordance with their interests as creditors. See, e.g., In re Lear Corp. S 'Holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 
97 (Del. Ch. 2007) (recounting the eagerness of a CEO holding a large deferred compensation 
interest in a fmancially fragile company to sell the company to a private bidder). Nonetheless, equity 
compensation grants typically have a stronger incentive effect because they are typically larger than 
deferred cash, and have value that is more responsive to the executives' actions. Deferred 
compensation in the form of preferred stock is almost unheard-of. 
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as against the preferred. 298 Creditors have no direct representation on the 
board, but they hold the greatest leverage in terms of capital market 
reputation. 299 Firms more frequently need to roll over their debt than raise 
new equity;300 if they wish to secure low-cost financing, they need to 
establish a reputation in the debt markets for good capital stewardship.301 
Preferred stock, by contrast, has little input into or sway over firm policy.302 
Preferred stock can regain its viability simply by gaining one of these 
two major protections (i.e., control or compensation) currently allocated to 
the common. 303 In theory, either will do, but DBC will prove more efficient 
than a system in which managers are compensated in preferred stock. This 
follows from the standard economic insight that maximizing the value of the 
residual claim-absent any opportunistic exploitation of a senior class by the 
junior-will maximize the overall value of the firm. 304 When managers' 
personal wealth is tied to the value of that residual interest, they will 
personally benefit from every iota of value they add to the firm. 305 In other 
words, incentive alignment is an inherently optimizing mechanism.306 By 
contrast, board control is most useful in controlling risk. 307 It confers on 
investors only the ability to encourage adequate management, because it 
ultimately relies on the power to replace the existing board with a new set of 
directors, whose expected performance will be average or worse. 308 Boards 
298See Fried & Ganor, supra note 8, at 975-76. 
299 See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 7, at 1215. They can also exert de facto control if 
debt covenants are breached, especially in private loan arrangements. See id. at 1211. 
300See id. at 1222-23. 
301See Soku Byoun, William T. Moore & Zhaoxia Xu, Why Do Some Firms Go Debt 
Free?, 42-1 ASIA-PACIFIC J. FIN. STUD. I, 3 (2012), available at http://www.apjfs.org/conference 
/20 12/cafmFile/9-4.pdf. 
302See Fried & Ganor, supra note 8, at 1008-10. 
303 See ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RICHARD A. BOOTH, ATTORNEY'S GUIDE TO BUSINESS 
AND FINANCE FuNDAMENTALS §11.16 (2d ed. 2007). 
304See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & 
ECON. 395, 403 (1983). 
305See id. 
306See Sayan Chatteijee, Does Increased Equity Ownership Lead to More Strategically 
Involved Boards?, 87 J. Bus. ETHICS 267,268 (2009) (noting increased stock ownership by board 
members has a positive correlation with corporate performance). 
307Cf Trados I, 2009 WL 2225958, at *1-*4 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009) (describing a 
company whose preferred shareholders' liquidation preference was safeguarded when the preferred-
controlled board approved a merger despite objections from the common shareholders). 
3081 am assuming that the ability of a director to manage a particular company is ex ante 
unobservable, in which case the investors should expect a new board to be of average talent and 
below-average experience. See Chatteijee, supra note 306, at 268. This is likely a generous 
assumption: given that directors and executives' track records typically consist of a small number of 
observations, their general managerial talent (if such a thing exists) cannot be reliably inferred from 
past performance. See id. To take but one example, hedge fund manager Eddie Lambert managed 
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performing above the fiftieth percentile are usually safe, and even boards of 
moderately underperforming firms are likely to keep their jobs.309 But this 
reality is acceptable to preferred shareholders, because they do not benefit 
from and thus do not require optimal firm performance. They will be happy 
as long as management maintains a safe cushion of common equity beneath 
the preferred and refrains from exploiting it. 
At the same time, the common should be nervous about handing over 
operational control to the preferred. As described above in Part I.F., an 
equity tranche yields control to a senior tranche at considerable peril,310 and 
cannot rely solely on equity compensation to protect their interests.311 To be 
sure, executives paid in common stock have an incentive to take risks that 
benefit the common.312 But executives are also naturally risk-averse, because 
their stock portfolios are not diversified and also because a risky investment 
that does not pan out might lead to the executives losing their jobs.313 
Holders of preferred stock are also naturally risk-averse, since they 
participate in losses but not in gains; they can be expected to be unhappy 
with the board if it takes risks.314 The temptation exists, therefore, for the 
preferred and the board to strike an implicit bargain: in exchange for 
pursuing the risk -averse strategy that the executives naturally prefer anyway, 
the preferred will let them keep their jobs. The interests of the common 
could be ignored. 
When companies enter a period of low profitability, the common 
encounters an even greater risk: that the preferred has an incentive to 
liquidate the firm as soon as possible, even if the firm has a pipeline ofNPV-
positive investment opportunities. In such situations, the equity cushion 
below the preferred has presumably shrunk, perhaps near zero. This means 
that the preferred would bear most of the losses if the projects do not 
to revitalize a moribund K-Mart franchise upon obtaining control; however, his subsequent attempt 
to turn around Sears was much less successful. See Nathan Vardi, Sears Shares Crushed on Eddie 
Lampert's One Year Anniversary as CEO, FORBES (Jan. 10, 2014, 9:52 
AM), http://www .forbes.corn/sites/nathanvardi/20 14/0 I /1 0/sears-shares-crushed-on-eddie-lamp 
erts-one-year-anniversary-as-ceo/. 
309See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 833, 857-64 (2005) (discussing the uphill battles shareholders face to replace 
boards). 
310This doesn't apply only to preferred, but to any senior class with a fixed claim. 
Jll See supra Part II. F. 
312See Knowledge Center-stock Basics, SCOTTRADE, http://research.scottrade.com/Pu 
blic/knowledgecenter/education/article.asp?docid=4192e85b45d 148ccbfl f285f03173a5a (last 
visited April29, 2014). 
313See MarkJ. Loewenstein, Making America Competitive, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 453,470 
(1993). 
314See generally FLETCHER CYC. L. CORP., supra note 9, § 5448 (explaining that preferred 
shareholders generally do not receive dividends above the predetermined amount). 
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perform, whereas they will see only a small benefit from a successful 
project. 315 Moreover, in such a situation, the preferred cannot trust managers 
who are compensated in common, because the common's reduced equity 
interest has come to closely resemble an at-the-money option. Thus, the 
managers will have an incentive to develop high-risk projects and attempt to 
disguise them as safe investments. Rather than face the prospect of having 
their good money after bad, the preferred investors will want to close up the 
shop--for instance, by selling the firm for cash. With control of the board, 
they will have the leverage to effect such a transaction. 
The common needs more than a guarantee that executives will be paid 
in common stock; it needs exclusive control over the compensation process. 
It should have the sole power to elect all the directors on the compensation 
committee, which in tum should be given exclusive authority over 
compensation-not simply to recommend pay packages, but to implement 
them as well316 (subject to sensible equitable principles).317 Generally, the 
common would want directors to avoid long exposure, directly or 
indirectly,318 to the firm's preferred stock, and to pay executives (and perhaps 
directors as well) primarily with heavily geared options that are extremely 
sensitive to the performance of the common stock.319 Under such a system, 
the board and the managers would resist liquidating the company without 
securing gains for the common, because they would have to forfeit a large 
amount of wealth (i.e., the option value they have been paid) to do so. In 
315See Knowledge Center-Stock Basics, supra note 312. 
316See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c)(2011) ("Any such committee [of the board], to the 
extent provided in the resolution of the board of directors, or in the bylaws of the corporation, shall 
have and may exercise all the powers and authority of the board of directors in the management of 
the business and affairs of the corporation .... "). 
317For instance, the preferred will seek charter provisions providing that all directors get 
compensated in the same way. 
318That is, owning preferred, or having substantial equity interest in a fum that owns a 
substantial interest in preferred. 
319Heavily geared options can retain substantial value even if they are far underwater. For 
instance, suppose that a firm has $50M in net assets, is losing money, and its residual claim sits 
beneath a liquidity preference of $150M. The fum would have to triple in value before the residual 
claim has any value, and thus the value of the common equity would be close to zero. Suppose, 
though, that each of five directors was given a security that would be worth $30M if the net asset 
value of the company were to reach $200M. Even if there is only a I 0 percent chance of that 
happening, the security would be worth $4M-which is a large sum of wealth that would disappear 
if the fum was sold. Note that the common would essentially be agreeing to pay the board the entire 
book value gain from $50M to $200M, which is extreme, but not irrational. For the company's 
value to quadruple, it would have to become highly profitable, in which case the company's asset 
value would likely continue to rise well past $200M and the common would then gain. Meanwhile, 
the current value of the equity is 0, so the common would have essentially nothing to lose any way. 
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essence, the common would be trying to buy off the directors' loyalties to the 
preferred holders who appointed them to the board. 
B. Divided Board Control in Operation 
This form of power allocation between the preferred and the common 
is well-modeled by the classic game-theory narrative of the prisoner's 
dilemma. In this particular instance, there are two players: the preferred and 
the common, each represented by the directors they appoint to the board. 
Each side can choose a Conflict strategy, in which they attempt to increase 
their compensation at the expense of the other player, or a Cooperation 
strategy, in which they try to pursue strategies that maximize the overall 
wealth of the firm and minimize opportunism. For the common, Conflict 
would consist of a risk-incentivizing executive compensation plan, perhaps 
centered on a large grant of out of the money stock options.320 Managers 
would have to pursue risky projects--ones advantageous to the common-in 
order to actually profit from their equity compensation. For preferred, 
Conflict would involve stripping the firm of assets and leaving little left 
over;321 it would entail policies such as aggressively removing managers who 
take high levels of risk and distributing free cash to shareholders. 
In firms expected to have short life spans, the actions of the equity 
investors could be modeled as a one-stage version of this game. In this 
scenario, both the common and the preferred will realize that Conflict strictly 
dominates Cooperation. 322 If one class of stock pursues Cooperation, the 
other would obtain large benefits from playing Conflict, essentially 
appropriating whatever value can be gleaned from unopposed exploitation of 
the cooperating stockholders. Thus, neither class of stock wants to play 
Cooperation unless it can be sure that the other class will do so as well. As 
there is no binding mechanism in a one-stage game, both classes can be 
expected to play Conflict, with dysfunction resulting. 
320See Susan J. Stabile, Motivating Executives: Does Peiformance-Based Compensation 
Positively Affect Managerial Peiformance?, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 227, 227-30(1999)(noting 
that executives compensated with stock options are risk-incentivized). 
321 Cf Trados I, 2009 WL 2225958, at *3-*4 (Del. Ch. July24, 2009) (describing a situation 
where the preferred-controlled board approved a merger that left nothing for the common 
shareholders). 
322That is, both sides will realize that Conflict will always be wealth-maximizing, regardless 
of what strategy the other side adopts. Here, Conflict both permits each side to opportunistically 
exploit a Cooperating adversary, and protects against exploitation by a Conflicting adversary. 
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In most cases, equity investors expect firms to have indefmite life, and 
thus they will tend to see themselves as playing many-stage game.323 If so, 
the two classes of stock can achieve a peaceful coexistence in equilibrium, 
by committing to a carrot-and-stick strategy for inducing Cooperation from 
the other class of stock.324 In particular, each class of stock can promise to 
play Cooperation until Conflict has been played against them, at which point 
they will punish the attempted opportunism by playing Conflict for many 
periods in a row. If each side knows that the other will play this strategy, it 
will be efficient to adopt the same strategy: the gains from a potentially 
indefinite period of Cooperation will trump whatever gains can be had by a 
short period of opportunistic gains. When both classes of stock are playing 
Cooperation, the value of the firm can be maximized. Projects will be 
evaluated, for instance, by their risk-adjusted net present value at a cost of 
capital that reflects a compromise between the common's desire for risky, 
upside-laden projects and the preferred's desire for low-discount-rate, safe 
investment strategies. 325 
For Cooperation to be a viable equilibrium, the common must be able 
to pre-commit to playing Conflict when the preferred does.326 Absent a pre-
commitment, one side could play Conflict for one period (thus expropriating 
some value) and test the other's resolve.327 Would the other class of stock 
really pull the trigger on the punishment strategy, knowing that they will be 
equally harmed by the devolution into the Conflict-Conflict dysfunctional 
equilibrium? In other words, the rival equity groups might skirmish and 
hope to call each other's bluff-an outcome that is itself inefficient, even 
without considering the non-zero possibility of one side actually deciding to 
revert to conflict mode. The common can avoid this outcome by means of 
compensation contracts. For instance, it might provide an executive with an 
323 See RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEW ART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE 64 (8th ed. 2006) (noting the valuation of shares presumes infmite corporate 
life); MARTIN J. OSBORNE & ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, A COURSE IN GAME THEORY 135 (1994) 
(describing repeated games). 
324See OSBORNE & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 323, at 133-49 (explaining repeated games). 
325 See HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 303, § 16.02 (comparing the risk levels of common 
and preferred stock and suggesting investing in common stock is for a person willing to take greater 
risk). 
326Technically, a pre-commitment by the preferred would also work. Such pre-commitment 
is more difficult, though, because directors are not permitted to bind their discretion in advance. Cf 
FLETCHER CYC. L. CORP., supra note 9, § 990 ("[D]irectors may not lawfully agree to abrogate the 
continuing duty to exercise their independent judgment with respect to determinations as to what is 
in the best interests of the corporation."). 
327See OSBORNE & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 323, at 133 (noting that terminating 
cooperation does have a short-term gain). 
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extremely generous severance upon removal by less-than-unanimous 
approval from disinterested directors, or make the executives' equity 
convertible into a smaller amount of debt. Both would reduce the value to 
the preferred of liquidating the firm. 328 Since the preferred would be on 
notice that they would be punished by playing Conflict, they would play 
Cooperation, and thus the common would have little incentive to deviate 
from that strategy. 
Thus, Cooperation can be a stable equilibrium, if the duration of the 
game is long. Mergers pose a threat, because they cut short the many-period 
game and thus nudge the parties into playing Conflict as a dominant 
strategy.329 If so, the preferred would likely prevail, by virtue of holding the 
legal power of the board. One mechanism at its disposal would be to cause 
the firm to merge on financial terms unfavorable to the common. If no 
external bidder emerged, a shell subsidiary could be created into which the 
company would merge. 330 To be sure, the common would not be helpless, as 
it could avail itself of all the contractual protections historically used by the 
preferred, such as class votes on mergers. 331 It could even block the board 
from taking action without its consent by insisting upon a supermajority 
quorum, thus giving its directors the ability to veto by not showing up.332 
Nonetheless, it is not hard to foresee that the common could have the same 
328This assumes, of course, that the common-elected directors would carefully implement an 
incentivizing compensation system. Admittedly, this is a significant assumption in light of current 
practice, which has only loosely tied compensation to performance. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse 
M. Fried, Pay without Performance: Overview of the Issues, 20 ACAD. MGMT. PERSP. 5, 8 (2006) 
(noting executive compensation is generally not performance-based). But for reasons explained 
below in Part II.B, there is reason to believe that compensation practices would significantly change 
under DBC. See supra Part U.B. 
329See OSBORNE & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 323, at 135 (describing the difference between 
finite and infmite games). Clearly, once a merger is proposed, then the corporation would be 
modeled as a single-period game in which the common and preferred each decide how to respond. 
See id. A merger need not materialize, though, for the many-period game to collapse. If the 
preferred can, at any point, solicit a merger, then it is immune to punishment for opportunistically 
deviating from the Cooperation strategy. All the common could do in response would be to play 
Conflict-at which point the preferred might simply merge the company away, likely to the 
common's detriment. Thus, the common might not have a credible threat to deploy against preferred 
opportunism. 
330See HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 303, § 13.02 (explaining merging into a shell 
subsidiary). 
331/d. § 13.02 (noting shareholders may vote as a class on mergers). 
332See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b)(20ll)("A majorityofthetotalnumberofdirectors 
shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business unless the certificate of incorporation or the 
bylaws require a greater number."). This strategy for blocking hostile board action has been upheld 
in Delaware. See Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401,407 (Del. 1985). 
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degree of trouble protecting its interests that preferred shareholders have 
now. 
However, in protecting against opportunistic mergers, the common 
would have two advantages that preferred shareholders lack today: control 
over compensation, and the benefit of the fiduciary duties owed to them 
under the common law.333 Would this make enough of a difference to 
prevent (or discourage) the preferred from lapsing into Conflict? It would 
depend on how the courts would characterize such preferred-initiated 
mergers. Minority shareholders are robustly protected against being cashed 
out at an inferior price by the majority.334 Arguably, the same protections 
would extend to the common in the case of a preferred-favored merger 
designed to cash out at least some portion of the common. Indeed, the recent 
decision of In re: Trados Inc. suggests that common shareholders would 
enjoy meaningful protection against unfair or unfaithful transactions 
propagated by a preferred-controlled board. 335 
C. Trados and Divided Board Control 
Trados336 can be viewed as the mirror image of the fact patterns in 
Equity-Linkecf37 Investors and LC Capita/.338 It also involved a merger that 
pit common against preferred, but in this case, the preferred had control; 
each of the four venture capital funds that had financed Trados as a startup 
appointed one member to a seven-person board. 339 After a few years of 
middling performance, the preferred started to look for an exit.340 To this 
end, the board hired a new management team, hoping that a new business 
plan and improved financial performance would make it an attractive 
acquisition target for a strategic buyer. 341 The compensation plan for the new 
333 See Trados I, 2009 WL 2225958, at *7 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009) (noting that boards owe 
shareholders equal fiduciary duties, but when the interests of the preferred and common conflict, the 
board is to favor the interests of the common). 
334See William J. Carney & George B. Shephard, The Mystery Of Delaware Law's 
Continuing Success, 2009 U. ILL. L. REv. I, 17-28 (2009); Subramanian, supra note 133, at 11-17. 
Generally, minority cash-outs are evaluated under the entire fairness standard unless the terms of the 
cash-out transaction are negotiated by an independent committee and the transaction receives the 
support of a majority of the minority investors. See In re MFW S'holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 504 
(Del. Ch. 2013). 
335 Trados I, 2009 WL 2225958, at *7. 
336See generally id. 
337Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040 (Del. Ch. 1997). 
338LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. James, 990 A.2d 435 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
339Trados I, 2009 WL 2225958, at *1-*2. 
340 /d. at *2. 
341/d. 
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executives included sizeable bonuses for arranging and closing a successful 
sale of the company.342 This strategy proved successful: the company's 
performance improved, and Trados sold itself to a company called SDL for 
$60M-a sum that, net of the $7.8M needed to pay the management 
bonuses, almost satisfied the preferred's liquidation preference and left the 
common with nothing.343 In a sense, the turnaround strategy was too 
successful, as the improved business performance gave the common 
shareholders some hope that their equity-which had long been zercr-might 
soon have some value. 344 The merger, of course, extinguished that hope, and 
the common shareholders sued the board for a breach of fiduciary duty.345 
Each of the preferred-appointed board members was employed by, and held 
equity in, the venture capital funds that owned the preferred stock.346 
In denying the defendants' motion to dismiss, Chancellor Chandler 
held that the board had acted self-interestedly in cashing out the common for 
no consideration when the company's financial fortunes seemed to be 
improving.347 In essence, the merger had negative value to the common, 
because their equity was extinguished when it still retained some significant 
option value. 348 In this respect, Trados can be usefully compared with the 
hypothetical "bad faith" scenario discussed in LC Capital, in which the 
merger had negative value to the preferred because it cashed out a 
guaranteed stream of dividends for consideration of lower present value.349 
Whereas LC Capital left the preferred to its own (non-existent) devices, 
Trados intervened on behalf of the common.350 By finding the board to have 
342Id at *3. 
343Trados I, 2009 WL 2225958, at *3-*4. 
344Id at *3. 
345 Id at *1. 
346/d. at *1-*2. 
341Trados I, 2009 WL 2225958, at *9. The alternatives would have been sharing merger 
consideration with the common, or waiting to sell until the improved business performance led to a 
valuation in which the common would have obtained some consideration. See id at *4. It is easy to 
understand why the preferred shareholders disliked both options. The latter was far from certain, 
and would have exposed the preferred to the risk that the company's value would actually decline; 
the former would further reduce their already lowered liquidation preference. Id 
348 /d. at *7. Strictly speaking, of course, common equity always retains some option value, 
so long as it is possible for the company's business to tum around and become profitable. See id 
The key fact in Trados I was that it appeared, from the complaint at least, that the company's 
business had already turned around. Id It was not certain that the common equity would ever 
regain value, but that prospect seemed to be more than a distant and remote possibility. Id 
349Compare id, with LC Capital v. James, 990 A.2d 435, 438 (Del. Ch. 2010). For a 
discussion of LC Capital, see supra Part II.E. 
35
°Compare LC Capital, 990 A.2d at 438, with Trados I, 2009 WL 2225958, at *4. 
2014 1HEPERILAND PROMISE OF PREFERRED STOCK 211 
been acting in breach of duty by favoring the interests of the preferred, the 
court forced the board to prove that the deal was entirely fair. 351 
Proving entire fairness turned out not to be a fool's errand for the 
Trados directors. In an opinion issued after trial (Trados II), Vice 
Chancellor Laster determined that the common stock had no value at the 
time of the merger.352 He thus characterized the transaction as entirely fair, 
even though he found that the directors had in fact acted in a self-interested 
fashion and had engaged in unfair dealing. 353 This resolution of the case was 
simultaneously justified on the facts and implausible in its outcome. The 
court engaged defendants' contentions in detail and without credulity;354 
indeed, it is difficult to pinpoint any significant flaw in its evaluation of the 
record. At the same time, the idea that the common equity lacked any option 
value makes little sense in a financial market in which deep-out-the-money, 
soon-to-expire stock options trade with positive value. Ultimately, the 
common's case was doomed from the start, because the record before the 
court was shaped entirely by the actions and testimony of directors and 
officers with a strong financial interest in an immediate sale. 355 Pointing out 
inconsistencies and flaws in the defendants' account was no substitute for 
affirmative evidence that, at the time of sale, the firm realistically could have 
appreciated to a value in excess of the liquidation preference.356 What the 
common needed was a decision-maker inside the company seeking to 
identify value for them or pushing back on the managers' convenient 
determinations that the future was all downhill. 
Taken together, the Trados opinions demonstrate both the viability of 
and the need for DBC. In this case, the preferred stockholders used their 
board control to avoid the sad fate of their counterparts in Equity-Linked 
351Technically, Trados I decided a motion to dismiss, and so the court did not find the 
directors to actually have breached their duties. Trados I, 2009 WL 2225958, at* 10. Nonetheless, 
the clear thrust of the opinion's logic is that the board will not be protected by the business judgment 
rule when they sell out the common stock for absolutely nothing. /d. As the court noted, "[i]t would 
not stretch reason to say that this is the worst possible outcome for the common stockholders." /d. at 
*7. Of course, the board will not be liable in a self-interested transaction if it can show entire 
fairness. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(3) (2011). 
352Trados II, 73 A. 3d 17,20 (Del. Ch. 2013). The Vice Chancellor inherited the case when 
Chancellor Chandler left the Delaware Court of Chancery. 
353 /d. at 56-65. 
354/d. 
355 /d. at 49. 
356The opinion scatters several references to inconsistencies in the directors' testimony 
throughout its discussion of entire fairness, culminating in the Vice Chancellor's fmal assessment of 
that testimony as "often problematic." Trados II, 73 A.3d at 76. Still, the plaintiff was unable to 
demonstrate that the firm could make sufficient profits to keep up with the accumulating preferred 
dividends. /d. 
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Investors and Thoughtworks. 357 The common, meanwhile, used the board's 
fiduciary duties to form a first line of defense against a zero-value cash-
out.358 But fiduciary duties proved inadequate to the task, as commonly is 
the case in corporate law.359 
The transaction might have looked different, and fairer to both parties, 
if the executives had been compensated differently.360 Directors who 
answered to the common shareholders might have designed the merger 
bonus package to incentivize the executives to obtain at least some value for 
the common. For instance, they might have granted a large tranche of 
common equity options with a strike price close to zero. Instead, the 
preferred-controlled board gave the executives a sizeable bonus simply for 
completing a deal for less than the liquidation preference. 361 
Taken together, the two Trados opinions have the potential to subtly 
but significantly reshape the law, encouraging the preferred and common 
shareholders to cooperate. It does not restore the peacekeeping paradigm, 
but it does at least give each side enough weaponry to deter bullying on the 
part of the other. As noted above, DBC levies some risks on the common 
that cannot be neutralized by the common's compensation powef62-the 
merger in Trados being just such a risk.363 When preferred-appointed 
directors want to cash out their investment at the common's expense, there 
may not exist any realistic compensation scheme powerful enough to change 
those incentives. In Trados, for instance, the directors' equity in (and career 
prospects with) the venture capital funds likely dwarfed in value whatever 
directors' fees they might have possibly earned from Trados.364 Entire 
fairness review helps protect the common against transactional exploitation, 
and makes it possible for them to willingly cede board control to the 
preferred.365 That willingness is necessary for DBC to gain a foothold, and 
357 See supra Part II. 
358See Trados I, 2009 WL 2225958, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009). 
359See id. at *I 0. 
360 See supra Part Ill. 
361 Trados I, 2009 WL 2225958, at *4 (noting that the executives were paid $7.8M in 
merger-related bonuses). 
362As noted above, the compensation power is most useful to push back against a preferred-
controlled board's tendency to manage too conservatively. See supra note 66 and accompanying 
text. It is of less use in a transactional context. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
363 Trados I, 2009 WL 2225958, at *7. 
364 /d. The company's CEO does not appear to have had exposure to Trados preferred. /d. 
But the board gave him an incentive to support the transaction by means of a large bonus to be paid 
out of the merger proceeds. /d. Under DBC, only common-elected directors would be able to 
authorize such bonuses, and presumably they would not have done so unless the merger carried 
some benefit for the common. See id. 
36SSeeid. 
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for preferred to regain its viability as a generally available financing 
mechanism. 
For these reasons, Trados is better viewed as a victory for the 
harmonious co-existence of common and preferred than as yet more 
evidence of Delaware's hostility to preferred stock. 366 Venture capitalists 
likely view it far less favorably. As Professors Bratton and Wachter have 
observed, the case empowers entrepreneurs or other common shareholders to 
potentially block, or at least delay, the sale of a VC portfolio company with 
negative common equity value.367 That delay can serve the cause of 
efficiency-for instance, if the VC's financial incentives lead it to sell the 
firm below its true enterprise value368-but also the cause of opportunism: 
the common can extract concessions from the VC simply by bringing and 
then settling derivative litigation. 369 On this view, Trados II is at best a mild 
palliative.370 While the VCs were able to prevail ultimately on the issue of 
fair price,371 it can only be described as a close case. The Vice Chancellor 
found that the board had engaged in unfair dealing, and even on the issue of 
price, he characterized the board's evidence at trial as "strained," "overly 
strident" and "exaggerated to the point of caricature. "372 These wounds may 
have been self-inflicted, and it might be supposed that a different board of 
directors would have produced a cleaner evidentiary record. Still, proof of 
entire fairness typically requires a trial, and trials cost money.373 Trados II 
might have reassured a nervous VC community, but it is hard to imagine that 
it caused much rejoicing.374 
VCs, however, constitute a special class of preferred shareholders.375 
They have little to gain from Trados because they already enjoy what Trados 
366See, e.g., Melissa M. McEllin, Rethinking Jedwab: A Revised Approach To Preferred 
Shareholder Rights, 2010 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 895, 918 (2010) ("[T]he In re Trados 
decision ... illustrates the low probability that preferred shareholders will prevail in preferential 
rights situations."). 
367See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 29, at 1877-81. 
368When fmns are struggling but not yet insolvent, preferred shareholders hold most (if not 
all) of the downside risk and yet have little upside. See id. Thus, they have an incentive to sell the 
fmn for whatever price they can fetch. 
369For example, the common may attempt to extract concessions from the VC by filing an 
action against the board of directors if a decision made by the directors, such as a merger, does not 
yield anything for the common. See, e.g., Trados U 73 A.3d 17, 17 (Del. Ch. 20 13 ). 
370See id. at 76. 
371/d. 
372 !d. at 66, 68, 71. 
313See supra note 353 and accompanying text. 
374See supra notes 372-73 and accompanying text. 
315See supra note 276 and accompanying text. 
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makes possible: the prospect of obtaining some board control.376 Divided 
Board Control, as described in this Article, is aimed at more established 
companies that currently have limited ability to raise preferred stock 
financing.377 As discussed in Part I above, preferred stock can be an elegant 
financing solution for firms with cyclical business models-one that permits 
the common to obtain significant upside through financial leverage, with less 
risk of total or near-totalloss in bankruptcy.378 To the extent that Trados 
makes it possible for DBC to function, it can be seen as a favorable remedy 
for preferred shareholders in general, if not for venture capitalists in 
particular.379 
It is also possible that DBC arrangements could help venture 
capitalists, by restoring the disinterestedness of the company's executives. In 
Trados itself, the executives were interested in the merger because the board 
had granted them sizeable bonuses payable upon the company's sale.380 
These bonuses incentivized both a quick sale and a good price, but not in 
equal measure: the executives had more to lose from delay than they had to 
gain from waiting for a price favorable to the common.381 Even though the 
bonuses increased non-linearly with increasing sale price, they were still 
significant at low sale prices and scaled up more rapidly at the low end ofthe 
valuation scale.382 For instance, the Trados CEO took home $2.34M at the 
sale price of $60M.383 An $11M increase in the sale price (which would 
have netted a grand total of$3M for the common) would have gained him an 
additional $430K, but an $11M decrease would have cost him $723K. More 
importantly, delay risked of losing the transaction-and the multi-million 
dollar bonus-entirely. Was the difference between the potential $2.77M 
bonus and the actual $2.34M worth the risk of a much smaller bonus or even 
none at all? Apparently the Vice Chancellor did not think so: he found that 
376See supra note 366. 
377 See supra Part III. 
378 See supra Part I. 
379See supra Part I. 
380 See Trados II, 73 A.3d 17, 20 (Del. Ch. 20 13) (noting that the executives were awarded a 
total of $7 .8M in bonuses upon merger completion). 
381/d. 
382That is, the incentive plan paid out to the executives a percentage of the total merger 
consideration, and that percentage itself increased as the merger consideration increased. Jd at 59. 
Had the sale price been between $30M -$40M, the executives would have received only 6 percent of 
the proceeds. Id. Had the management team been able to obtain more than $120M, they would 
have kept 15 percent. Id 
383/d 
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the bonus plan "skewed the negotiation and structure of the Merger in a 
manner adverse to the common stockholders. "384 
Suppose, by contrast, that Trados had a divided board in which the 
common held ultimate power over compensation. If so, this exact same 
bonus plan might have been interpreted quite differently, as evidence that the 
managers were incentivized to seek higher sale prices but did not believe that 
a better price could be obtained. To the extent that the incentives were 
improperly designed, the common shareholders would have had only 
themselves to blame. Indeed, a common-approved compensation plan might 
even have handed the board a victory on the motion to dismiss. Of course, 
the compensation plan would probably have looked quite a bit different had 
it been designed by the common. It would have been the product of 
negotiation between the two classes of stock, and could easily have yielded a 
more equitable result. 
It is harder to assess whether Trados is sufficient to protect the 
common from preferred board control. Technically, the holding of the case 
rests on the fact that the directors owned equity in the funds that held the 
preferred stock; thus, they were financially self-interested in the decision to 
sell the company and pay off the liquidation preference.385 What if the 
preferred shareholders had appointed directors loyal to their interests, but 
who did not own any equity? This is a critical question: if the court will not 
prevent preferred-loyal directors from pursuing transactions to exploit the 
common, then the DBC grand bargain would collapse. Perhaps sensing its 
importance, the Chancellor avoided the issue: 
Each of these four directors was designated to the Trados board 
by a holder of a significant number of preferred shares. While 
this, alone, may not be enough to rebut the presumption of the 
business judgment rule, plaintiff has alleged more.386 
The second sentence was supported by citations to two conflicting 
authorities: Citron v. Fairchild Camera &Instrument Corp., which held that 
a director's representation of one of the corporation's largest shareholders 
"alone did not make him an interested director,"387 and a contrary holding 
from the Court of Chancery in Goldman v. Pogo. com, that directors who 
"were the representatives of shareholders which ... are both alleged to have 
384Trados II, 73 A.3d at 61. 
385See Trados 1, 2009 WL 2225958, at *10 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009). 
386Jd at *8 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
387Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 65 (Del. 1989). 
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had a direct financial interest in this transaction . . . . " were possibly 
interested.388 This is not remotely a fair fight. Fairchild Camera is a 
Delaware Supreme Court opinion that has been cited dozens of times, often 
for its statements offoundational corporate law principles. 389 Pogo. com, by 
contrast, is a minor Court of Chancery opinion that has been cited primarily 
for its boilerplate recitation that "[a] claim of tortious interference with a 
contractual right requires . . . a contract, a breach of that contract, and an 
injury. "390 It is not hard to predict how a future court would resolve this 
particular split of authority if forced to make a choice. 
However, DBC may be viable without a position on director 
independence as strong as that articulated in Pogo. com. As Airgas recently 
discovered during its hostile bid for Air Products, directors are not 
necessarily loyal to those who merely nominated or appointed them.391 A 
preferred shareholder bloc seeking to exploit the common would likely 
appoint directors with deeper bonds ofloyalty. 392 Under existing precedent, 
courts could easily find such directors to be interested. For instance, In re 
Primedia Derivative Litigation held that, when directors have "substantial 
past or current relationships, both of a business and of a personal nature," it 
can be inferred (depending on the facts, of course) that the directors felt "a 
sense of owingness to their mutual patron" that would sterilize their 
discretion.393 Whether the common can rely on the court sniffing out the 
directors' loyalties is another question. Presumably, the preferred will seek 
to appoint directors with whom they are not visibly associated but whom 
they can trust to do their bidding. 
Ultimately, the issue likely reduces to one of risk versus reward. 
Obviously, the common would be unlikely to take any chances with board 
control if it has little to gain by doing so. In most situations, perhaps, the 
388Goldman v. Pogo.com, Inc., 2002 WL 1358760, at *3 (Del. Ch. June 14, 2002). 
389See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., 638 A.2d 1110, 1114 (Del. 1994) ("For a 
dominating relationship to exist in the absence of controlling stock ownership, a plaintiff must allege 
domination by a minority shareholder though actual control of corporation conduct." (quoting 
Fairchild Camera, 569 A.2d at 70)). 
390See, e.g., Allied Capital Corp. v. GC-Sun Holdings, L.P., 910 A.2d 1020, 1036 n.32 
{Del. Ch. 2006) (quoting Pogo.com, 2002 WL 1358760, at *8). Its assertion that directors lack 
disinterest with regards to powerful shareholders who appointed them has not been seconded. 
391See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 103-04 (Del. Ch. 2011) 
(noting that the three directors nominated by Air Products and elected in a subsequent proxy contest 
voted with the incumbent board members to reject Air Products' offer and to maintain Airgas' poison 
pill). 
392 See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text. 
393/n re Prirnedia Inc. Derivative Litig., 910 A.2d 248,261 n.45 (Del. Ch. 2006) (internal 
citations and quotations omitted). 
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common will be perfectly happy to issue debt, preferring the bankruptcy risk 
thereby created to the risk of exploitation in a system of DBC.394 In some 
circumstances, however, the common might sufficiently value the fmancial 
flexibility afforded by preferred stock-in particular, the ability to defer 
dividends in periods of financial stress--enough to acquiesce to DBC.395 
What seems clear is that DBC opens at least a possibility of the continued 
viability of preferred stock as a financing vehicle outside of highly 
specialized contexts. 396 The Delaware courts should continue to expand its 
protection of common shareholders from exploitation by the preferred, in 
order to make DBC a viable option. 
D. An Extra Benefit: Pay For Performance 
The central purpose of DBC is to render preferred stock more 
investment-worthy, and thus would-be preferred shareholders stand to gain 
the most by its adoption.397 However, DBC holds important ancillary 
benefits for the common. One of them, as discussed above, is the utility that 
might flow from the greater availability of preferred stock financing. 398 Less 
obviously, but more importantly, DBC offers a mechanism by which 
investors can reduce the agency costs associated with inefficient executive 
compensation. 399 
Executive compensation of large public companies attracts a wide 
range of criticism, but one of the more persuasive arguments has focused on 
the dissociation between executives' pay and their performance.400 As 
Professors Fried and Bebchuk have long argued, currently dominant 
compensation practices do not effectively motivate executives to manage in 
the shareholders' best interests, nor reliably reward (or punish) them for 
successfully (or not) doing so.401 While these observations have been 
presented as part of a more comprehensive and highly controversial 
"managerial power" theory,402 one does not have to endorse their entire 
argument in order to think highly of performance-sensitive compensation. 
394See Partnoy, supra note 31, at 804. 
395See supra Part II.B. 
396See infra Part IV. 
397 See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text. 
398See supra Part ll.B. 
399See supra Part m.D. 
400 See generally LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE M. FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: 
THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2006). 
401 See id. at 6-8. 
402See id. at 61-79. 
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Perhaps the market price of a firm's common stock should not be the 
ultimate benchmark of managerial performance, but surely strong market 
performance is at least a goal and an indicator of managerial prowess. 403 One 
does not have to accept the idea that managers should focus solely on the 
welfare of shareholders-to the exclusion of other stakeholders or other 
members of the firm's production team-to be concerned that managers 
focus too much on their own welfare. One need not be an advocate of 
"shareholder power" to be concerned that vast quantities of corporate 
resources are being inefficiently deployed, doing more to enrich executives 
than to create economic value.404 
There are several reasons why boards approve executive compensation 
plans that under-incent. Perhaps most important is the board's own lack of 
incentive to achieve optimality.405 Neither their wealth nor their job security 
is likely to be meaningfully impacted by the amount of effort they devote to 
compensation issues.406 Thus, they tend to delegate compensation matters to 
consultants, human resources managers, or the firm's legal departmenr07-
each of whom have incentives to recommend "safe" pay packages in lieu of 
innovations that would actually increase performance-sensitivity.408 
Shareholders, in turn, lack a meaningful ability to hold the directors 
accountable for their compensation decisions, by virtue of the 'bundling 
problem.'409 The shareholder franchise permits only a choice between 
403Some commentators have argued that the obsessive focus by executives and investors on 
short-term stock price fluctuations has decreased overall corporate efficiency by promoting (or 
fostering a culture of) myopic management. See David I. Walker, The Challenge Of Improving The 
Long-Term Focus Of Executive Pay, 51 B.C. L. REV 435, 440 (201 0) (collecting arguments linking 
equity compensation to short-termism among managers). It is true that executives increasingly 
massage earnings the more equity they hold, and that massaging earnings frequently sacrifices long-
term performance--such as when a fum cuts research and development expenditures in order to 
reduce present period costs. !d. at 441-42. Moreover, the fmancial crisis of2008 has made it more 
difficult to view stock market prices as informationally efficient. Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that 
stock market prices are either uninformative or dis-informative, or that the costs of myopia usually 
outweigh the benefits of incentivized management. The burden of demonstrating either proposition 
has not been met. Equity-based compensation is surely no panacea for the ills of corporate 
governance, but it can contribute to agency-cost reduction if structured wisely in conjunction with 
other mechanisms. 
404 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 400, at 1. 
405 See Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation: Where We Are and How We Got There 
132, (Marshall Sch. Bus., Working Paper No. 204167), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfrn?abstract_id=2041679. 
406Jd. 
4071 d. at 140-41. 
408ld. 
409See Bebchuk, supra note 309, at 857 (describing how shareholders carmot punish 
directors for individual decisions because their only means of discipline is to vote the directors out of 
office, which they will not do if the directors' performance has been otherwise acceptable). 
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candidates based on overall performance.410 Thus, shareholders are unlikely 
to vote against a decently-performing board even if they are unhappy with 
many of its particular decisions-such as compensation-if the alternative is 
the risky decision to elect a slate of directors who lack experience with the 
company and an established track record.411 In addition, psychological 
factors likely play a role. Directors may feel beholden to executives for 
helping them obtain (and retain) their seats; they may value friendship with 
the executives; and they may simply be risk-averse, willing to over-pay an 
incumbent CEO to avoid even a minimal risk that the CEO may leave for 
greener pastures.412 
DBC, by contrast, provides a structural remedy for most of these 
shortcomings of the current process.413 It operates by means of the logic of 
necessity. Investors have to demand performance-sensitivity for executive 
pay, because that is the primary lever by which to protect their interest in 
risk-taking.414 As described above in Part III.A., executives and directors, 
like preferred holders, naturally avoid risk: whereas they enjoy the generous 
compensation, perks, and prestige that comes with their positions so long as 
the company stays stable, they likely will lose their job and perhaps their 
whole career if the flrm enters distress. 415 If the board and thus the managers 
answer to the preferred, risk-aversion will result, and the upside potential of 
the flrm-the most important economic interest of the common stock-will 
be diminished.416 But this implicit collusion can be broken if the right 
incentives are built into the compensation scheme. If managers' base 
compensation is set fairly low, but the rewards for common stock 
appreciation are very high, then the managers will gain an appetite for risk. 417 
410See id. at 836-38. 
411See id. at 857-58. 
412 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 400, at 4 (discussing these factors and other causes of 
under-incentivizing compensation). In the last decade, an extensive literature on executive 
compensation has developed, much of which criticizes the Bebchuk!Fried "managerial power" 
argument that executive compensation reflects the power of executives in setting their own pay. See, 
e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REv. 987, 1033-37 (2010) 
(describing the recent diminishment of CEO influence over the board, including over matters of 
compensation); cf Kevin J. Murphy & Michael C. Jensen, CEO Bonus Plans And How to Fix Them 
5-6 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 1935654), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa 
pers.cfm?abstract_id=l935654 (recognizing that even critics of the managerial power view, 
including Murphy and Jensen themselves, acknowledge that executive compensation generally 
under-incents executives to maximize the corporation's economic profits). 
413 See infra notes 416-19 and accompanying text. 
414See supra Part ill. B. 
415 See supra Part ill.A. 
416See supra Part ill.A. 
417 See supra Part ill.A. 
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Many people would not risk losing a job that paid them two million a year 
for a chance at ten, but they might risk a salary of half a million a year for a 
chance at fifty. 
Moreover, DBC provides mechanisms by which the common's 
demands can be easily translated into action by the board's compensation 
committee.418 First, it establishes clear accountability and expectations for 
the directors elected to the compensation committee.419 They would be 
elected specifically to optimize compensation, and the shareholders would 
have fewer qualms about replacing those directors if their performance is 
inadequate.420 The bundling problem would be solved because shareholders 
would not have to (or be able to) to elect an entirely new, untested board in 
order to address their unhappiness with the performance of the compensation 
committee.421 Second, the common-appointed directors' own risk-aversion 
would be redirected toward optimizing compensation.422 Their constituents 
will fear the departure of a good executive less than collusion between 
executives and the preferred, and so directors who want to keep their jobs 
will err on the side of hard bargaining.423 Finally, the expectation of 
collegiality on the board would be reduced.424 While the common, the 
preferred, and the directors themselves would all prefer for the board to 
function as a team, it would be understood by all parties that the directors 
represented different constituencies with interests that occasionally 
conflicted. If disputes are inevitable, the directors won't seek to avoid them 
at all costs. 
To be sure, DBC is no panacea for the many problems that plague the 
executive compensation process, even if it were the case that all companies 
adopted a DBC governance regime. It is easy, after all, to talk of optimal 
compensation for executives; it is much harder, in practice, to determine 
what that might be in real world situations. That practical reality does not 
disappear just because directors have better incentives to strive for 
optimality. Still, compensation is likely to improve if the directors' 
incentives improve. That DBC can help in this regard is surely a feather in 
its cap. 
418See infra notes 419-24 and accompanying text. 
419See supra Part ill.A. 
420 See supra Part Ill. A. 
421 See supra note 411 and accompanying text. 
422 See supra Part ill. 
423 See supra Part ill. A. 
424See supra note 414 and accompanying text. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Preferred stock has been placed in a difficult spot by the case law of 
the past two decades. Its current plight recalls the warnings of the famed 
investor (and mentor to Warren Buffett) Benjamin Graham, that the yield of 
preferred stock is almost never sufficient to justify the risk of maltreatment 
by the board.425 In large measure, the decline in its investment worthiness 
has been a product of the increasing financial and legal sophistication of 
directors and their advisors; the economics of and legal strategies for 
exploitation have been widely disseminated. However, what innovation 
produced, innovation can reduce. Preferred and common stockholders can 
use those very same tools-such as distribution of voting rights and equity 
compensation-to craft an equity structure characterized by harmony 
between the different classes. 
425 See BENJAMIN GRAHAM, THE INTELLIGENT INVEsTOR 50 ( 1949) (arguing that preferred 
stock should be "bought on a bargain basis or not at all" and that even the rare "good" preferred 
stock is "good in spite of their investment form, which is inherently a bad one"). 

